




Home Office



Lead Responsible Officer

Guidance

Foreword

Serious and organised crime (SOC) is the most serious threat faced by UK citizens. Increasing in volume, complexity and sophistication of criminal techniques, the 4,772 mapped organised crime groups (OCGs), with 36,953 associated nominals who are criminally active within the UK,¹ continue to have a corrosive impact on our public services, communities, reputation and way of life. Your role as Lead Responsible Officer (LRO) is critical in helping protect people, businesses and communities from the harm they cause.

Leading the response, you will be instrumental in disrupting OCGs' ability to function by diminishing their capability, infrastructure and influence.

This guidance is primarily aimed at police officers undertaking the role of LRO in the disruption of OCGs, and is equally applicable for colleagues performing this role from any partner agency. It is designed to provide a suite of options, encompassing strategic, tactical and operational approaches, which can be relied upon to design and deliver a multi-agency response covering the pillars of Pursue, Prevent, Protect and Prepare (4Ps).

Significant focus and influence has been directed towards capturing 'what has worked in practice' in shaping this guidance, to ensure it is directly relevant to and useable for practitioners.

It is also hoped that all SOC partners, tasked with tackling new and emerging threats within the SOC landscape (including those from other criminal networks such as county lines and urban street gangs, high harm individuals, vulnerabilities that are exploited and place-based harm attributed to the manifestations of SOC) will also be able to refer to this guidance for support.

The challenge for LROs is significant and this guidance is designed to support you in delivering the response to this chronic and corrosive threat. We want to encourage you to think creatively to develop new and original interventions that tackle OCGs and reduce the harm they cause, ensuring there is no safe space for OCGs to operate within the UK.

¹ National Crime Agency, national Strategic Assessment 2020

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
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Part 1: The LRO's strategic response to tackle OCGs

Section A – The LRO and other key roles in OCG management

LRO's role and responsibilities

The LRO's main role is to lead the response in tackling and disrupting OCGs and the harm they cause.

The LRO's primary responsibilities² in fulfilling this will include:

- supporting the Senior Responsible Officer's (SRO) objectives in tackling OCG
- leading the design and co-ordination of multi-agency 4P plans and subsequent tasking of resources to respond and implement them
- identifying and consulting with stakeholders who are able to offer bespoke expertise and support e.g. overt and covert SOC tactical advisers, community co-ordinators, community safety partnership managers
- holding people to account for their role in delivering activities identified in the 4P plan
- capturing and reporting on the impact and outcomes from the plans
- taking responsibility to ensure compliance and adherence to national, regional and local standard operating procedures and guidelines
- ensuring that all decisions are documented to provide transparency and accountability
- enhancing the intelligence picture by identifying gaps and instigating tasking requirements to fill them
- conducting regular operational reviews to ensure plans remain commensurate with the level of threat and with strategic objectives
- establishing operational de-briefing to ensure learning is captured and recycled

² College of Policing, LRO role profile: <https://profdev.college.police.uk/professional-profile/serious-and-organised-crime-tactical-advisor-soctac/>



Part 1

Who should be the LRO?

The LRO should be the most appropriately positioned person to lead the overall response to a particular OCG and should be decided on a case-by-case basis, depending on the dynamics of the OCG and the policy of the force.



Helpful tip:

In deciding who is the most appropriately positioned person, ask: “Who is best placed to answer an operational question on the response?”



Good practice

shows the role of LRO is generally best served by an officer of at least inspector rank. They may work in any police department, but should be operationally closest to design an appropriate response and sufficiently empowered to allocate the appropriate staff, assets and resources to tackle the OCG.

Allocation is therefore made on the basis of who is best placed to tackle the OCG as opposed to being generically allocated on the basis of postholder position or specific rank e.g. member of force or Basic Command Unit (BCU) senior officer.

Senior Responsible Officer (SRO)

The role of SRO within the OCG landscape is given to the officer who has overall responsibility for overseeing the force’s response in tackling OCGs.

In some larger forces they are often supported by a non-statutory role of deputy SRO, who may be a person within the BCU senior management team responsible for oversight of OCGs within a BCU.



Helpful tip:

LROs should build a strong relationship with the SRO/deputy as they will be able to offer them helpful insight and experience.

The SRO role usually rests within the crime management department, undertaken by Head of Crime or Head of Serious and Organised Crime. As SRO, they will normally chair an OCG management meeting, tasking meeting or equivalent, into which LROs will report and be held to account for their 4P plan. Some SROs are expected to report into force executive boards, outlining the current and emerging OCG threat picture and how harm caused by OCGs has been reduced.

Establishing an LRO forum – a force-wide community of interest (COI)

Continual professional development is essential to enable LROs to deliver real impact against OCGs.



Helpful tip:

The SRO (or deputy) should try to establish a force-level COI for LROs to support and enhance their skills and knowledge.



Good practice

for establishing and maintaining a COI:

- Circulate new legislation to keep LROs up to date with changing legislation e.g. disclosure
- Regular meetings ensure sustainability, either in person or virtually every 1-2 months
- Share learning and good practice regarding any of the Ps
- Promote personal and professional development e.g. courses and external learning opportunities
- Encourage innovative, creative and forward-thinking approaches, ideas and initiatives

- Provide opportunities for external agencies to showcase their capabilities and how these could help
- Circulate new document publications e.g. NCA threat assessments, Home Office guidance, Regional Organised Crime Threat Assessment (ROCTA) performance assessment criteria, SOC review developments
- Share good practice captured from other forces/partners or agencies reflecting developments in policing, new approaches to evidence-based policing and how these could be applied
- Run Q&A problem-solving sessions

Senior Investigating Officer (SIO)

The SIO role is to lead the investigative response into OCGs and their criminality, which predominately focuses on securing criminal-justice-based outcomes.

This response will cover strategies, policies and procedures associated with the Victim, Offender and Location matrix.

In some instances, when tackling the most complex and sensitive investigations into OCGs, the SIO will perform the LRO role.



Helpful tip:

LROs should maintain regular communication with the SIO beyond structured management-based meetings and each be prepared to share their objectives and operational plans so they mutually complement and support each other.

Deconflicting the LRO and SIO role

The LRO may well require the expertise of an SIO, who will invariably be supported by an investigation team.

In the context of tackling OCGs, operational practice reflects that the SIO is generally most suited to focus on leading the Pursue response only, effectively becoming a 'P lead' (see later). This works particularly well when both overt and covert investigation methods are employed and allows community-based matters requiring Prevent, Protect and Prepare responses to be managed by others who are more appropriately positioned and located to do so.

However, if the LRO is also undertaking a 'relentless disruption' phase of Pursue or organising other P-based responses it is important that the SIO is made aware of these so they do not compromise any aspect of the investigation.

In some instances, due to operational sensitivity, the SIO may well be required to perform the LRO function as well, for example if there is both a covert investigation with particular sensitivities and other conventional investigation or disruption phase being run simultaneously. If this is the case it is likely Prevent, Protect and Prepare phases may be temporarily parked, albeit options exist for these responsibilities to be delegated to a community-based colleague performing P lead roles.

The roles of LRO and SIO are different, but most impactful when mutually supportive, trusted relationships are built and good lines of communication exist.

Gold, Silver, Bronze model

OCG management is not assigned a formal command structure, though operational practice often benefits from one.



Good practice

for a command structure is modelled on the Gold, Silver, Bronze framework.



Helpful tip:

LROs should establish a command structure for managing the OCG within the context of roles and responsibilities.

Gold: the SRO, or Dep. SRO, responsible for providing the overarching Strategic Vision for Managing OCG's within the force, and who holds overall responsibility



Silver: the LRO responsible for managing and co-ordinating the operational response for each OCG, and accountable to the SRO, or their nominated deputy



Bronze: the P lead, whether for 1 or multiple P's, e.g. Bronze, Pursue (detective for Investigation) and Bronze Prevent, Protect and Prepare (Community based work)





Section B – Understanding OCGs

Legal definitions

Definitions

OCGs are described as individuals, normally working with others, with the intent and capability to commit serious crime on a continuing basis, which includes elements of planning, control, co-ordination and group decision making.³

Serious crime involves the use of violence, results in substantial financial gain or is conducted by a large number persons in pursuit of a common purpose or crime for which a person aged 21 or over on first conviction would reasonably expect to be imprisoned for three years or more.⁴

Significant harm can be caused by groups as well as individuals. This could include significant impact on community safety or wellbeing, serious violence, corruption and/or exercise of control over an individual or community.

Intention captures the motivation and drive of the group, reflecting what it wants or intends to do e.g. maximising profits from existing activities, expanding criminality into new areas.


Capability describes the group's ability to carry out or implement its intent, often based on the resources available to the group and their knowledge in how to do it.

Continuing basis is the intention of the group to continue committing crime on multiple occasions over time – rather than as a one off.

3 Serious Crime Act 2015

4 Section 93 (4) Police Act 1997

SOC offences⁵



In addition to the above, evidence indicates that OCGs are increasingly being linked to involvement in:

- counterfeiting of lifestyle items, particularly clothing, alcohol and tobacco
- environmental crime, including illegal dumping of waste
- medicinal adulteration e.g. Viagra
- food crime

- wildlife crime, including smuggling of endangered species
- data acquisition for criminal use and exploitation

LROs should be aware that the National Strategic Assessment of SOC and associated National Control Strategy⁶ groups SOC into three main categories:

- Those who **dominate** communities and chase profits in the criminal market place e.g. drugs, firearms and acquisitive crime

5 National Crime Agency, National Strategic Assessment 2020

6 National Crime Agency, National Strategic Assessment 2020: www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk



Part 1

- Those who **undermine** the UK's economy, integrity, infrastructure and institutions e.g. fraud, money laundering, corruption and cyber based
- Those who **exploit** the vulnerable e.g. modern slavery, human trafficking, immigration crime and CSA/CSE

OCGs and other offending

Established OCG members will often have a long and ongoing criminal history.

This often involves the whole spectrum of offending, from lowest to highest level. From abuse and non-compliance with local byelaws such as dog fouling, graffiti, fly-tipping, cycling on pavements/footpaths; involvement in lower-level offending such as aggressive driving and committing public order offences; involvement in more serious criminality, especially against the state by means of fraud such as benefit-based and tax frauds; to the most serious forms of domestic abuse and other acts of random and orchestrated serious violence.



Helpful tip:

Comprehensive exploration of ALL of their habits, routines and lifestyle choices will present LROs with many opportunities to disrupt the OCG and their networks.

Characteristics

Every OCG is different. There is no one size fits all and each OCG will have characteristics which allows them to change and adapt, form and reform into different configurations to remain operationally effective and financially successful at what they do.



Helpful tip:

LROs should seek to understand the characteristics of the OCG as this will allow you to specifically tailor elements of your response, so you can start to frustrate and dismantle the network.

OCG models can be grouped into three general types:

1. Those with hierarchical or organisational structure
2. Groups based on local or ethnic connections
3. Co-operatives where they form alliances with other criminal actors, forming economic business-type relationships, where criminal alliances with others actors forge and pool skills, capabilities and assets for a specific purpose or to realise a criminal opportunity

The following table details some of the most common characteristics of OCGs, but the list is not exhaustive:

Consistent core membership	Groups of key individuals, blood relatives, extended family, life-long friends and former prison mates
Poly-criminality	Involvement in numerous criminal activities
Hierarchical	Defined levels of leadership and responsibilities among members
Loose networks of criminal associates	Forms and comes together for a mutually beneficial enterprise, not bound by cultural/religious or social indicators
Use of violence and threats	To secure and establish reputation, commodity and geographic control
Corruption	Seek to corrupt influential people ,e.g. public officials, where in return for payment or other reward, abuse their office and position to benefit a third party
Coercion	Exploitation of existing familial, romantic, friendship and social links with people by control, persuasion or adverse influence – this is done to obtain reach, insight and influence into businesses and local authorities to secure contracts, allowing them to gain access to goods and service provision
Business interests	Act as a front for other criminality or are cash-rich businesses to launder money e.g. hair/nail salons, car dealerships, restaurants, building businesses Also view people as no more than commodities to be exploited
Lavish lifestyles	Conspicuous display of material possessions such as expensive cars, houses and jewellery coupled with flamboyant lifestyles, attending expensive clubs, casinos, sports, music events and holidays
Technology, digital and cyber enabled for communication and criminality	Technology and digitisation to support their communication methods and criminality and to act as a counter measure against law enforcement capabilities e.g. encryption devices and platforms Advanced communication capabilities such as the dark web, cloud and social media platforms that make attribution of the digital footprint more difficult



Part 1

Business relationships between OCGs and with extremist groups	Nominals increasingly facilitating each other's access to commodities within illicit markets
Professional enablers	Targeted exploitation of professionals, such as accountants, estate agents and lawyers, whether complicit, negligent or unwitting to disguise or facilitate the movement of illicit funds
Laundering money	Exploiting digital currencies, using money service bureaus and other forms of smuggling to divert funds within and out of the UK to international jurisdictions
Use of false instruments	Facilitate criminality through the use of fraudulent documentation and other instruments
Use of countermeasures against law enforcement	Behaviours and actions designed to disrupt, prevent or mitigate law enforcement activities against them e.g. communicating in code, use of encryption, foreign or pre-paid SIM cards, counter and anti-surveillance measures
Most significant motivation for OCGs	Money

OCGs as a business model

OCGs are increasingly operating like legitimate businesses, demonstrating levels of sophistication, resilience and adaptability as they seek to establish and control illicit markets while also gaining a foothold and influence within legitimate and established business and infrastructures.



Helpful tip:

LROs may find it helpful to focus on understanding the holistic business model of the OCG in the context of how a legitimate business would operate.

The following diagram highlights the similarities between legitimate and OCG business models.

Legitimate business models	OCG business model
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Multi-commodity products available 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Multi-commodity e.g. drugs, firearms, trafficking, fraud
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CEO, managers and frontline staff 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Principal, significant and peripheral members
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Profit generating and driven – salaries paid 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Profit motivated, income collected
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Transport networks for supply chain management 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Transport methods used for illicit commodity purchase/supply and distribution
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Market penetration and sales, with analysis of market trends 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Local enforcement of reputation/territory and debts to secure market control and influence
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Communication and marketing to promote brands with online presence to bolster sales 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dark web, digital currencies and secure communications establish online marketplace
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Adaptability to change to meet demand, with profits reinvested into new ventures for diversification 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Operate with agility, with profits re-invested for criminal and commodity diversification
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Franchise-type business operating model may be used e.g. chains of stores in different locations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • OCG represents a controlling mind, allocating geographical responsibility to key members e.g. exportation of county line networks to various communities
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Special offers to promote sales 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bulk purchase order with decreasing price ratios and offers to underwrite competitors and get client base
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ability to resonate with public opinion e.g. environmental footprint 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Adapt to meet social trends e.g. ‘ethically sourced cocaine’



Part 1

Using this approach you will be able to identify critical parts in the network to establish where the interdiction points are. This will assist in designing simple but impactful interventions to disrupt specific elements of the model so you can break it e.g. the junction between transportation and exchange of the commodity or disrupting the laundering of illicit funds by identifying the interdiction point for collection and payment methods.

Recognising that the main motivation for any business is usually profit is key. Understanding the financial footprint and money trail of the OCG will be the axis around which the whole business model will work.



Helpful tip:

Following the OCG's financial footprint, either the money or its transferred value, will allow you to disrupt the cash flow, seize and remove the assets. This will impede its functionality and help break the business model.

Members of an OCG – principal, significant and peripheral nominals

OCG members are categorised according to the role they play, namely principal, significant or peripheral nominals. This is distinctively different from those who are just 'associates' of these nominals.



Helpful tip:

LROs should focus on familiarising themselves with the main criminal nominals within the OCG, the role they play and what they do as part of it. This will enable you to prioritise your response to target the most appropriate nominals.

The following table highlights some of the factors which may be attributed to each of the actors and roles.

<p>PRINCIPAL nominal – could be described as ‘kingpin’ or ‘person in charge’</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Directing and organising the criminal enterprise • Usually hands-off and distanced from frontline activity • Substantial links to, and influence on, others in the chain • Closest link to original source/supplier of commodities, with up-stream contacts • Expectation of, and recipient of, substantial financial gain • Links to other businesses used as a front for criminal activities • Establishes a position of trust or responsibility within community to reflect reputation and/or give impression of respectability • Controls those in the OCG through fear/ violence with the ability to exert pressure on their families and others in the community to retain control • May secure loyalty by providing financial security to OCG members and their families if nominal is imprisoned
<p>SIGNIFICANT nominal – could be described as lynchpin’ or ‘trusted lieutenant’</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • May perform one of several key operational or management functions within the group e.g. commodity distribution, finance collection, debt enforcement • Often has close ties to the principal and is trusted by them • Involves others in the operation whether by pressure, influence, intimidation or reward • Motivated by financial or other advantage, whether or not operating alone • Some awareness and understanding of the scale of operation • Provision of specialist skills or facilitator (professional enablers in this group)



Part 1

PERIPHERAL nominal, could be described as ‘foot soldier’

- Performs a limited function under direction as a means of lifestyle choice or engaged by pressure, coercion, intimidation or involvement through naivety and/or exploitation
- No or very limited influence on those above in the group
- Acts for payment in commodity or cash
- Often on the victim/offender nexus
- May be vulnerable and usually ingratiated to OCG by one of the recognised SOC pathways
- Often try to project an elevated status within OCG to others
- Most fluid member of OCG, in/out and easily discarded or overlooked
- One of several fulfilling the same task e.g. lookout, runner, car thief, street dealer
- Mostly hands-on, being tasked and directed and with very limited ‘say’ in what happens

The volume of nominals within an OCG, coupled with their links to additional associates, may quickly become a daunting number of individuals you are tasked to tackle. You will not be able to tackle all of them, so identifying those playing key roles will allow you to target the right people where you will achieve most impact by making their lives as difficult as possible.

Section C – OCG mapping and management

OCG mapping is a nationally agreed process to form a consistent approach to identifying, assessing and mapping OCGs⁷ to understand threat.

The subsequent management of OCGs is separate, but does revisit the OCGM scoring as part of the management process.



Helpful tip:

LROs should ensure they understand the mapping and management processes and their involvement in them.

The OCG mapping process is managed by the ROCTA team who form part of the Regional Organised Crime Unit (ROCU). They are often supported by designated staff within forces. The process is regularly reviewed and adapted to ensure it remains relevant to the constantly changing nature of SOC and OCG threats.

Identification, assessment and mapping

The identification of OCGs involves enhanced analysis of information and intelligence, including the use of sensitive material, to create a more informed picture to verify whether an OCG exists and to understand the threat, harm and risk they pose.

The assessment and mapping processes are designed to fully understand the threat posed and produce scoring matrices via Police National Database (PND) which take into consideration information such as the individual's details, criminal activity, range of geographical impact, network and their characteristics.

As LROs it is important to recognise that the OCGM harm banding system is being complemented by MoRiLE as the means to manage the risk. Regular contact with the ROCTA team or in-force single point of contact (SPOC) will advise you on the mechanics of how this works.

7 ACPO Organised Crime Group Mapping Guidance, part 1, 2 and 3



Part 1

The PND system relies on threat bands and scores:

Organised Crime Group Mapping Bands

	Low level or infrequent criminality; impact local, hidden	Moderate scale or volume impact local, diluted	Serious or frequent criminality; impact visible, temporary	Significant level of criminality impact visible and acute	Extremely high scale, multiple crime types visible, chronic impact
Highly organised and disciplined; expert, resourced; coerce and/ or corrupt others	5A	4A	3A	2A	1A
Display structure and competence; may regularly use violence and/ specialists	5B	4B	3B	2B	1B
Fluid, disorganised; may have transient membership and lack skill or resources	5C	4C	3C	2C	1C
	Criminality				
	Low level	Moderate	Serious	Significant	Extremely high

↑ Highly organised and disciplined
 ↑ Intent and capability
 Display structure and competence
 ↑ Fluid, disorganised and transient

Understanding the OCG threat bands and scores

Having inputted information into PND an OCG score is created which is calibrated onto the above grid.

Numbers: indicate how harmful the OCG's criminality is, with 1 being highest harm

Letters: indicate how competent the OCG is to carry out its criminality, with A being most competent

Band: is the combination of letter and number to reflect the category of threat the OCG falls into on the grid

In understanding the band, the LRO can use a working assumption: the lower the number and letter (in alphabetical sequence) the higher the threat, with 1A being the highest level of threat and 5C the lowest.

This scoring mechanism will remain within the PND database.

MoRiLE

MoRiLE is a risk assessment tool, which uses a standardised approach and common language to allow strategic and tactical issues of risk to be assessed in a consistent manner against a set of indicators for all SOC threats, including OCGs.



OCGs are increasingly being assessed using MoRiLE and this will become the dominant method in influencing decision making to tackle the risks associated to the OCG.

Morile 20/20 introduces some minor changes to the assessment of SOC threats, including OCGs, specifically relating to the assessment dashboards of:

- community impact
- geography
- organisational risk indicator to reflect the force's capability to deal with it
- opportunity to deal with it

It is important to understand that Morile is a separate process to SOC tasking.



Part 1

The role of OCGM in tasking

Tasking is one of the management processes which tackles the threat by assigning it to be dealt with by an appropriate person, team, force or agency.

Developments within tasking have lead to a SOC system tasking model being created.

SOC system tasking is a multi-agency project, with the aim of establishing a single, whole-system approach to fighting SOC. This will be done by aligning collective efforts at all levels to:

- **develop a single prioritised view of demand**
- **task the highest-priority responses accordingly**
- **co-ordinate equal access to capabilities**

This is designed to provide the best collective system response to the increasing volume and complexity of SOC.

Additional key features in SOC System Tasking Model

1. **The prioritisation mechanism** ensures that all partners assess SOC demand in the same way, creating a single view of prioritisation across the whole system and supporting the Federated Tasking Team (FTT) to identify the highest priorities, task and allocate resource to.
2. **The SOC master list** provides the single compiled view of threat, risk and harm across the SOC system, which has been assessed and prioritised in a consistent way using MoRiLE. This is used to inform tasking at all levels, hosted on the SOC platform and maintained by the FTT.
3. **The multi-agency FTT** makes dynamic day-to-day decisions about tasking, co-ordinating equal partner access to capabilities, providing a single view of prioritised SOC demand and enabling unilateral access to information for all partners, all of which is supported by common goals and values.
4. **SOC system tasking governance forums** review the threat picture, define SOC priorities, task responses and allocate capability at all levels.
5. **FTT intelligence and performance products e.g. APMIS (the Agency and Partner Management Information System)** to identify trends at a thematic, operational and tactical level and are used to inform SOC system tasking decisions at all levels by providing a mutual understanding of demand, capacity, capability and impact being made across the system.

Tiers of response

Each mapped OCG is subject to a level of response called a tier and as LRO you will be responsible for leading the different levels of activity.

Forces and law enforcement agencies have different capabilities and the response within each tier will vary. As LRO you will need to determine what activities will support the tier of response you are tasked with managing.

Tier 1 – Comprehensive operational or investigative intervention

- This involves the proactive or reactive criminal investigation of an OCG as the main response using a multitude of assets

Tier 2 – Limited plan/action that prevents or disrupts

- This intervention or response is ‘limited or constrained’ in some way and could be any type of P-based response that disrupts the OCG’s ability to function

Tier 3 – Proactive intelligence development

- This level of response involves activity which proactively collects and gathers intelligence to construct a better understanding of an OCG, prior to planned responses aligned to tier 1 or 2 intervention options

Tier 4 – Developing opportunities for action

- This management level ensures that the OCG remains mapped and is aggregated at the relevant times – it involves the intelligence and information systems being regularly scanned for actionable intelligence

Each OCG has a designated review period aligned to each tier of response, within which intelligence, threat scoring and disruptions are re-assessed to reflect changes to the OCG, the impact from interventions and current harm being caused. These are:

Tier 1 – monthly

Tier 2 – quarterly

Tier 3 – quarterly

Tier 4 – 6 months



Helpful Tip

LROs should note that they can instigate a Trigger Review outside of these time scales if there is a change to the intelligence picture or impact from interventions.

Prioritisation mechanism (P-mech) or ‘P banding’

A new prioritisation process has been developed to form part of the national SOC system tasking programme, referred to as P-mech.



Part 1

Those fitting the criteria of posing the highest risk will be given a 'P band', ranging from P1-P4, which will determine enhanced response levels and will be managed in the national SOC master list.

If an OCG is tasked to you at force level with a P band, additional specialist advice will be given through tasking processes and from ROCTA colleagues relating to specialist capabilities you may be able to secure access to.

Activity against these OCGs will also be reported on via regional tasking processes to inform the regional governance group and also be part of the regional control strategy, all of which report into similar national governance structures.



Helpful tip:

LROs should retain regular contact with the ROCTA liaison officer if managing an OCG under P-mech, not just wait for the tasking updates. This will ensure you receive the full level of support and access to capabilities you need.

Management of OCGs

The management processes include allocation of the OCG to an LRO, decisions being made concerning the response required based on prioritisation and threat, review periods and updates, 4P plan updates, moderation mechanisms to assess the levels of disruption achieved and ensuring operational debriefs and learning.

Initial allocation of an OCG to an LRO

The decision to allocate LRO responsibility will be via a combination of national, regional and force-based tasking policy. This process regularly evolves and LROs should ensure they remain sighted on tasking processes.

From this process you should receive an OCG management document containing information to help you, which may include:

- formal notification that the OCG has been tasked to you
- an intelligence overview of the OCG, including assessments of its criminality and members
- an OCG MoRiLE assessment and/or threat score and band and P-mech if relevant
- an indicator for the tiered level of response required
- a 4P plan outline, which may contain some pre-set objectives or interventions
- a tactical activity log to record interventions with requirements for update reporting

OCG meetings

OCGs managed at force level will be discussed in a range of internal and external meetings e.g. at force SOC boards, force OCG management boards, ROCTA tasking and moderation meetings, multi-agency SOC boards or community safety partnership meetings. Within these, LRO plans can be discussed and all options considered and tasked to the appropriate stakeholder.

Additional meetings within the governance framework are held at regional and national level for those OCGs managed by ROCUs and the NCA.



Helpful tip:

LROs should actively seek to ensure they know which meetings they are expected to attend in person and which will accept written updates and outcomes from your plans and stakeholder groups. This ensures the whole tasking system functions effectively.

Combining covert operations with community-based interventions

Flexibility in having different P leads specialising in designing complementary responses for covert investigative and community-led approaches will provide opportunity for LROs to deliver a comprehensive, proportionate and joined-up response.

Having responsibility for the overarching 4P plan does not mean you have to personally lead each of the P-based pillars. This is particularly the case when covert investigations are undertaken using specialist tactics and capabilities.

Stakeholders may be better placed to lead and/or deliver specific activities across the 4Ps. It is therefore important to consider delegation where appropriate for a more effective response.

This is particularly helpful when an LRO is managing an OCG involving a covert operation run in force, within ROCU or the NCA, but also trying to design a community-based response to mitigate the impact, where you may assign several colleagues to different P roles.

Forces will be running protracted and covert operations, with significant emphasis on Pursue-based criminal investigations, led by an SIO, often from a specialist department.

It is not always realistic for details of these operations and nominals under investigation to be shared, however working practice has helped craft some options for the LRO and SIO to potentially jointly consider to ensure a 4P plan remains viable.



Good practice

for LROs if they need to design a Prevent, Protect and Prepare response to support a covert investigation:

- Indoctrination document to be agreed to cover information and intelligence access and dissemination
- Identify a single 3P liaison officer (SPOC) via tasking, to co-ordinate multiple P-based interventions within Prevent, Protect and Prepare framework with key community stakeholders



Part 1

- Provide sanitised briefing (excluding names/addresses and other case-relevant sensitive information) to the P SPOC and request they design responses, which may use interventions to target spaces/areas affected post arrest phase
- Ensure meeting triangulation between LRO, SIO (or Pursue lead) and community 3P SPOC
- 3P SPOC to design response and interventions with key partners, working to a trigger date with the SIO and LRO



Helpful tip:

The LRO's decisions and rationale should be recorded or referenced on the OCG management document as these will reflect the focus of your plan. Remember it is equally important to record rationale for what you are not doing as well as what you are!

A combination of force policy and personal preference will determine whether this is within a secure section of the management plan, a policy book or other medium.

Written records

LROs must adhere to all the requirements of the Criminal Procedures and Investigation Act⁸ when recording their objectives and decision making to provide transparency and justification for their actions.



Good practice

shows a selection of decisions which should always be recorded relating to a 4P approach:

- overarching operational objectives
- aim of each P pillar and who will lead these
- whether any specific P strand can't be developed
- nominals you are focusing on
- area of the business model being targeted

8 Criminal Procedure and Investigation Act 1996

- rationale for relentless disruption if no investigation
- adopting a place-based approach to tackle harm and impact on a community as opposed to an offender-centric approach e.g. where OCGs may operate remotely in cyber or fraud cases
- partner agency stakeholders who are tasked or who have agreed to lead a specific P response or individual intervention
- information and intelligence collection protocols



Helpful tip:

When recording performance outcomes, a general principle to follow is:

- quantitative reporting usually applies to Pursue-based interventions attributable to reducing the threat
- qualitative reporting applies to all 4P interventions attributable to reducing the threat

Disruption methodology assesses the impact of activities and associated outputs in reducing the threat from an OCG, a key individual or a specific vulnerability linked to SOC. It is applicable across a variety of activities at a local, regional or national level.

Disruptions can be recorded across all pillars of the 4Ps, from traditional law enforcement Pursue responses, to a broader spectrum of Prevent, Protect and Prepare activities carried out against SOC enablers and vulnerabilities by a range of partner agencies and government departments.

National guidance exists in relation to the definition and application of the disruption methodology⁹ and ROCTA SPOCs will help synchronise this in moderation meetings to develop consistent evaluation of the impact of the collective effort against the OCG threat.

OCG performance monitoring – a quantitative and qualitative approach

OCG performance monitoring is determined by assessing the impact in disrupting the OCG's threat, and can be reflected both quantitatively and qualitatively.

APMIS is the central repository to capture operational activity and performance outcomes.

9 National minimum standards for assessing and recording disruptions against SOC



Part 1



Helpful tip:

LROs should maintain regular contact with their ROCTA performance SPOCs to ensure they have the most up-to-date guidance available to them and the disruptions across all 4Ps are properly reflected for assessment by the moderation panel.

As part of the disruption performance monitoring, LRO responsibilities will include:

- recording and assessing all interventions/disruptions undertaken in line with national minimum standards
- involvement and participation in the periodic re-scoring of the OCG, as per OCGM guidelines
- being part of regular local disruption moderation processes to assess the disruptive impact activity against the OCG, to ensure consistency in approach, in line with national minimum standards
- following a period of disruption, reviewing the OCG or the 4P plan to re-synchronise against changes to criminality, intelligence requirements and fresh disruption opportunities being considered

- Disruptions and performance data supplied by the LRO dovetails into force, regional and national tasking and threat groups, captured by the NCA and held within the master list to provide a national performance assessment to understand the collective national impact against SOC.

This subsequently informs future strategic decision making on SOC priorities, intelligence gaps, resource allocation, capability development and SOC systems alignment. This then percolates back to regional and local level stakeholders creating a virtuous cycle.



Helpful tip:

The LRO should be mindful of the significance of properly assessing the outcomes of their interventions. This will not only do themselves and their teams justice for the work undertaken, but contribute to how this informs the national landscape.

Assessing the impact of a disruption

In the national disruption reporting process, the LRO will be responsible for assessing the impact of activity that leads to disruptions against the OCG. Disruptions are event based, meaning multiple disruptions can be recorded against an OCG. They can also be recorded across the 4Ps, and should reflect activity in line with 4P plans. Disruptions should be assessed using the national minimum standards guidance.



Helpful tip:

The LRO should work with partnership groups to determine the level of impact caused by the event-based disruption(s), applying context on a local, regional and national level where appropriate.



Good practice

selection of **quantitative considerations** from the Pursue landscape which have been used to attribute assessment of impact and threat reduction:

- Has the status of the OCG member(s) been disrupted i.e. principal group member, significant member, or peripheral member? Has this resulted in a loss of key skills or leadership within the OCG? Have they been arrested or remanded in custody, or are they free to continue their criminal activity?

- To what extent has the criminal activity of the OCG been disrupted e.g. as a result of days of action, warrants executed, arrests, closure orders, enforcement of bail conditions, serving of criminality and deterrent notices, SCPOs and other orders, vehicles seized, recalls to prison, restrictions whilst in prison?
- Has the disruption caused the OCG (or individual member(s)) to change the way they operate i.e. have communication methods, supply routes, or frequency of supply changed, and to what degree?
- Where a commodity has been seized, how much of the OCG's overall capacity does this represent? What is their ability to replace that commodity?
- When criminal finances have been seized, confiscated, or frozen, how much of their overall income or assets does this represent? To what extent has that impacted on their ability to finance their criminal activity? What is their ability to replace the finances lost?
- Where an awareness campaign has been carried out, to what extent has this resulted in a change of behaviour among its target audience?
- What is the impact of non-Pursue activities causing disruption by denial of opportunity to commit crime? E.g. safeguarding of adults/children/businesses, mitigation of crime, target hardening or diversion of criminal behaviour



Part 1



Good practice

selection of **qualitative considerations** from the Prevent, Protect and Prepare landscape which have been used to attribute assessment of impact and threat reduction:

- Enhancement in community knowledge, understanding and awareness of SOC and how it manifests within local communities, capturing how behaviour has changed as a result e.g. undermined permissive behaviours and attitudes to reduce tolerance
- Positive mobilisation of community assets offering credible alternatives e.g. where this has provided new opportunities and pathways away from SOC which people have embraced as a lifestyle choice
- Increased intelligence flow between community, law enforcement and local agencies reflecting public confidence
- Evidence of community wellbeing improving e.g. people feeling safer
- Refreshed ability of statutory agencies to identify and engage with vulnerable and socially excluded members of the community, including those who may be at risk of SOC pathways and impact of this

- Reported reduction in the critical demand on public services, including a specific piece of intentional law enforcement activity
- Attitude and behaviour change within community after counter-narrative campaigns



Helpful tip:

Establishing a robust reporting mechanism to capture a 'running log' of timely outcomes from interventions as soon as they occur will save you significant time rather than trying to retrospectively gather historic results.

Post-operational learning and communication

Success should be celebrated and lessons learned.



Helpful tip:


LROs should instigate post-activity operational debriefs with all stakeholders and those who have been involved in disrupting the OCG.



Good practice

agenda items to consider for successful post-operational de-briefing:

- Recognise good work e.g. letters of appreciation and personal thanks to partner agencies
- Impact stakeholders had on disrupting the OCG, ensuring this is reflected both quantitatively and qualitatively
- Post-operation intelligence de-brief to capture previously unsubmitted intelligence from all stakeholders
- Post-operation learning de-brief, ensuring organisational memory is created for the benefit of other LROs
- Corporate communication methods and tools are maximised to reinforce your SOC brand and successes to the community
- Performance boards, within force and partner agencies, from local to executive level, are informed of outcomes and subsequent harm reduction – showing reduction in harm over time in chart-based form is highly effective



PART 2: The LRO's tactical approach in developing an intelligence-led multi-agency response

Section D – Developing an intelligence-led response

Data, information and intelligence

Data, information and intelligence are all part of the same continuum – different in definition and function, but equal in importance for the LRO to help inform effective decision making.

Working definitions to help LROs understand data, information and intelligence

Data in its raw form is a recorded truth at a point in time – a snapshot of an event which is recorded in a quantifiable way e.g. a financial transaction or a telephone number.

Information is the product formed when data is brought together to provide a narrative, knowledge or context which may help answer questions, including the who, what, when, where or how elements e.g. how much was spent from all the transactions, how many conversations were made with a given individual over time and who that person was.

Intelligence is created when information is bound together and analysed to find out what it means, providing an insight into why, which then enables informed decision making e.g. £ spent on pre-cursor chemicals for supply to others to produce crack cocaine.

For the purpose of this guidance and in accordance with operational understanding within policing, only information and intelligence will be referred to, though the same principles apply for data as well.

Information and intelligence gathering

Seeking a better understanding of how an OCG operates and the harm it causes is essential in developing an effective intelligence-led response.



Helpful tip:

LROs should seek support from other agencies, partner organisations and local groups to capture a vast array of data, information and intelligence which will paint a richer picture of your OCG.

It is important to ensure you have fully explored all available and relevant internal opportunities.



Part 2



Good practice

shows significant intelligence retrieval is captured from the most regularly forgotten sources:

- Professional standards and anti-corruption teams, whose information may help to identify potential unhealthy relationships being established which will safeguard operational security and integrity
- Financial investigation teams and their ability to access the suspicious activity reporting scheme (SARS) and associated databases can help to show financial entities and footprints to assets, links between nominals and local businesses who may be laundering monies or disguising criminality for the OCGs and the identification of professional enablers working for the OCGs

- Neighbourhood officers and Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs) aligned to the area where the OCG nominals live or operate in will often have a treasure trove of local information – encourage them to share it
- Prison intelligence teams, whose information may show current criminal network contacts from past associations



Helpful tip:

When seeking to enhance your knowledge of the OCG, remain focused on what you are trying to understand.

A selection of the below may help as initial indicators for this:

<p>The OCG</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • OCG type – Does it comprise of tight familiar structures or a looser network of associates forming and re-forming? • Members of the group – Who are they and what is their role within the group e.g. principal, secondary or peripheral members? • Composition of familial networks – Who are the partners, children and relations? • Operating models – What type is being used to make them successful and viable criminal entities e.g. use of violence, contacts, price of commodities being sold? • Targeted recruitment and coercion – What methodologies are being used to entice vulnerable people into its operating model? • Financial models used or adopted e.g. virtual currencies, cash based, or digital • Poly-criminal or single crime expertise – Are they specialising in one crime type, beginning to diversify or involved in multiple crime types? • Communication methods preferred e.g. apps, encrypted technology, dark web, voiceover gaming consoles
<p>Criminal market</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Geographical operating space – Is it virtual, international, regional or local? • Local drivers of vulnerability that are influencing individuals to willingly access the criminal market • Transport methods – Is the OCG using the same methods, routes and facilitators? • Operating models changing or adapting – Are they introducing new illicit commodities to meet emerging market opportunities? • Corruption of officials – Is the OCG developing unhealthy relationships with officials or seeking to unduly influence others? • Points of connectivity and criminal co-operation with other OCGs e.g. division of market, facilitation of commodity supply and distribution, division of operating space, area of impact



Part 2

Impact on the community

- Level of community tolerance and the drivers of this – Are combinations of factors attributed to this e.g. permissive behaviours, socio-economic impact factors or coercion?
- Enablers, facilitators and service providers – Who are they e.g. cyber specialists, launderers, forgers, other professional enablers including accountants, estate agents and legal practitioners?
- Level of dominance and control in a community – How is this exerted?
- Hidden harm caused by the OCG – What are they and how are they attributed to its activities?

Information and intelligence sharing

The capture, analysis and use of intelligence should be the responsibility of all stakeholders and be a dynamic and ongoing process underpinned by shared principles.



Helpful tip:

LROs should ensure the principle of needing to share information and intelligence as the overriding aim of all stakeholders in order to understand the totality of the OCG threat. Trust in this process will form the foundation on which everything else is built.

Some partners will be nervous about sharing information and it is important to inspire confidence in them to do this.



Helpful tip:

LROs should remind partner agency stakeholders that information sharing is underpinned by a range of legislation including that from the Crime and Disorder Act 2014¹⁰ and the Data Protection Act 2018.¹¹

“The Data Protection Act 2018 is not a barrier to sharing information but provides a framework to ensure that personal information about living persons is shared appropriately.”

10 Crime and Disorder Threat, Risk and HARM: Scoring of OCGs Act 2014

11 Data Protection Act 2018

Information and intelligence management protocols

Co-ordinating the process of information management to tackle the OCG is one of the biggest challenges for LROs.



Helpful tip:

LROs should establish clear information and intelligence protocols from the outset. Getting this right will prove to be a critical success factor.



Good practice

shows the following options may help to provide a secure foundation for this:

- Indoctrination agreement, signed by all stakeholders for operational security purposes
- Legislative requirements for lawful access to information
- Standardised framework for information sharing and collation e.g. Lancashire's Operation GENGA¹² information sharing agreement (ISA)
- Methods for sharing information from LRO to the group e.g. OCG on a page, briefings, verbal, written or via digital platforms

- SPOCs established within partner agencies, groups and organisations who can be tasked with collation requirements and with whom you can liaise directly
- Tasking arrangements and protocols for transferring ownership of risk between agencies
- Protocols for managing Freedom of Information Act requests
- Government Security Classification
- Requirements for acquisition, storage and deletion

Developing an intelligence requirement, collection plan and response



Helpful tip:

LROs should continually review the intelligence picture of the OCG to fashion an intelligence-led response.

12 Operation Genga, Lancashire Police; Hoyle, Catherine catherine.hoyle@lancashire.pnn.police.uk



Part 2



Good practice

using a structure for this will help. One option shown to work is:

- requirement: What data and information do I need to enhance what is already known, or to plug a gap on what is not known?
- collection plan: From whom or where can the information be obtained and by what method – penetrative, covert or overtly?
- response: What operational business or intervention will this drive?



Helpful tip:

LROs may find it useful for both clarity and de-confliction for intelligence requirements and proposed collection plans to be recorded in a separate section of the 4P management plan, rather than being part of the Pursue, Prevent, Protect or Prepare pillars.

Need to know or nice to know?



Helpful tip:

LROs should focus on what they need to know, not what is nice to know.



Good practice

shows that in differentiating and prioritising between the two, needing to know something about the OCG should have an underlying intent to ensure that it will lead to or significantly contribute towards helping shape an intervention or disruption from the Prevent, Protect and Prepare pillars, not just Pursue.



Helpful tip:

LROs should not fall into the trap of continually trying to capture more intelligence because it's nice to know. While you do this, the OCG will continue to operate and cause harm.

Disruption tactics can be undertaken at any time, irrespective of whether you have a complete intelligence picture or not. There will always be an opportunity and sometimes the simplest tactics work best. This should be considered when requesting information from partners.

Requesting information from partners

When requesting information from partners to enrich the OCG intelligence picture, it is common to ask partners for 'everything they have', often in the hope that 'we will get something'.

This may create an unnecessary burden on the recipient and may impede your access to what you are actually trying to find out.



Helpful tip:

Making specific information requests to agencies and partners, rather than a generic 'catch all' request, may lead to a far better product.



Good practice

shows that utilising the sections from the College of Policing menu of tactics¹³ allows you to align specific information requests to given criteria of the OCG.



Business: Any businesses that are owned, used, influence, or controlled by an OCG and provide an income (or potentially assets) capability and finance.



Crime: Any criminal behaviour or legitimate activity being used to facilitate criminality



Travel: Any countries, areas, localities or premises regularly visited



Vehicles: Any vehicles or transport methods used



Behaviour: What are the OCG's habits? What do they do?



Lifestyle: Other factors indicating what the OCG does with their time e.g. gym membership, casinos, sports or music events

13 College of Policing menu of tactics: whatworks.college.police.uk



Part 2



Helpful tip:

LROs have found this approach beneficial because the specific intelligence request, linked to any of the set criteria, also provides a pathway to one of many disruption tactics illustrated in those same headings within the manual.

Collecting partner agency information to inform understanding of OCGs and SOC threats

Partners will be able to add value to the intelligence picture if they understand what is being asked of them.

LROs may find themselves working with partner agencies whose staff do not fully understand how the manifestations of SOC or the criminality of OCGs reflects within their agencies business, or that the IT systems do not capture information within a SOC or OCG context.



Helpful tip:

LROs should consider the language used and the questions asked of partners when speaking about OCGs and consider removing specific reference to OCGs or SOC.



Good practice

shows that a selection of the below questions elicits a better response, e.g.

- Who are the individuals that your agency is called to deal with the most?
- Are you noticing any new/emerging trends/incidents that you're being called to?
- Which elements of your business continue to create the most demand?
- What are the crime types causing the highest number of public complaints?
- What do you think are the causes and drivers of crime that your agency has to deal with?

As opposed to more traditional approaches of:

- Who are the OCG nominals known to your agency?
- What SOC offences are you aware of?
- How is SOC impacting you?
- What SOC trends are you aware of?



Helpful tip:

Having acquired information in this format, the LRO can then pollinate this against OCG or SOC threat data held on police and other systems' databases to determine if the information is SOC or OCG linked.

Case examples of where this approach has worked to create a better understanding of the activities of the OCG and their impact:

Health

Reported a sudden increase in stress-related illnesses being reported, with increased demand of people requesting anti-depressants. This was shown to be attributed to an OCG nominal in the area becoming a loan shark, providing money before Christmas and recovering it afterwards. Those unable to pay were made to grow cannabis in various premises to pay back debt.

RSPCA

Reported an increasing number of complaints about an individual running a puppy farm. When names were cross referenced, he was an OCG nominal.

Local authority

Reported an increase in complaints of youths riding bikes dangerously in a given area of town on pavements and through prohibited areas. This enabled officers to identify a newly formed county line where bikes were used as transport.

University

Reported trends of students barely complying with course requirements and found they were linked to an OCG and had registered purely to establish a foothold in the student drug market.

Private housing company

Reported a dramatic increase in digital key activations for social housing premises. Exploration of this identified 'cuckoo' premises being used by a criminal network who had established a county line.



Part 2

Head teacher

Reported a trend where an unusual number of children were deliberately misbehaving so as to become excluded and thus referred to a pupil referral unit (PRU). This revealed that an OCG was targeting new arrivals in the PRU and offering drug-running opportunities to earn money.

Public

Reported anti-social behaviour in an increasing number of children congregating in certain areas. It was established that these were paid 'eyeballs' for an OCG controlling crack houses in the vicinity.

Fire service

Reported a series of dustbin fires where bins had been moved close to shop fronts. It was strongly suspected that this was linked to OCG threats and intimidation tactics in an area to establish a protection racket.

Private sector financial institutions

Effective ISAs and membership of SOC boards resulted in a number of financial institutions providing significant intelligence on OCG nominals and disposition of assets laundered overseas.

Travel agent

Identified an unusual pattern of requests for one-way flights to the UK from multiple persons living in specific towns in a Western Balkan state, later revealing this was a favoured trafficking town and route used by OCGs involved in trafficking and slavery.

Creating a consistent understanding of the OCG and its impact for partners and stakeholders

A picture paints a thousand words!



Helpful tip:

LROs should arrange for the information collated on an OCG to be graphically illustrated or pictorially represented so it can be easily understandable and consistently interpreted.



Helpful tip:

Having choreographed the intelligence into an understandable format, the LRO should ensure it is disseminated to those who can best use it to make a difference, such as police teams, partner agencies and stakeholder groups.



Good practice

has identified a number of ways this can be achieved:

Criminal network association charts

These represent the criminal network of the OCG, and can contain a variety of information, including linked nominals, their premises, vehicles, phone numbers and criminality. Colour coding linked entities to specific OCGs will help you and partners sanitise and process the information being portrayed.

These are useful for LROs to understand the roles of different members of the OCG network or where there is OCG rivalry or turf wars being conducted.

Family tree

Creating a family tree for the OCG is also helpful, especially in understanding inter-familial dynamics including identification of partners and siblings. It will help to identify those most at risk by virtue of relationship proximity to the nominals. This is key for LROs when considering safeguarding options.




Part 2

Geographic profile of harm hotspots¹⁴

A profile can overlay a combination of harm, drivers of criminality and community-based vulnerability within a specific area, all associated with one or more OCGs. Providing a place-based understanding of risk or geographic profile of the OCG's sphere of influence will be useful for LROs where the only options for intervention may be from Prevent, Protect and Prepare interventions.

In some forces these will be completed as a matter of course by analysts or other appropriately skilled staff. If not, the LRO may wish to consider commissioning one to be shared with partners and other stakeholders.



14 Courtesy of West Midlands Police

OCGs on a page¹⁵

This is an intelligence product created primarily for the purpose of briefing LROs, partners and frontline staff about the OCG. It will usually include OCG nominals, maps of key locations, and criminality.

SMITH OCG
STRICTLY FOR INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES

Criminality of the OCG

Cocaine Supply
Multi-kilos of high purity cocaine are sourced, cut and supplied to lower level dealers and also individual customers. Nesbitt and Smith are very 'hands on'. Drugs are supplied from Smith's address, through his associates and [some] tenants or via the deliveries made from a local business

Counterfeit Goods
Both Nesbitt and Darby sell fake luxury handbags and watches (mainly online).

Violence
Mr Wood has previously been arrested for DV offences but there is no intel to suggest the group as a whole are involved in violence

Principal & Significant Members

David Smith
b.

Mr Wood b.
Courier

Mr Darby
b.
Courier

Mr Nesbitt
b.
Sources Drugs
Courier

Note: Insert photo's

Sig. Member of

Assists with money laundering
Safe house
Safe house

Peripheral Subjects:
John Smith b. (father) of 1 High Street
Julie Jones b. (partner) – 5 White Tce,
Andrew White b. (tenant of Smith) – 1 Main Road

OCG Links
Association with members of:
ALPHA OCG
BETA OCG
SIGMA OCG (Met)

Possible ongoing Rivalry:
DELTA OCG
GAMMA OCG (Mids)
Members have previously taxed Nesbitt (HISTORIC)

OMEGA OCG (NW)

- Large scale drug supply
- Serious violence
- Principal imprisoned

Money Laundering

Smith owns a number of local properties that are rented out to associates. Some have then been involved in drug criminality. Smith also owns 5 static caravans.

Darby owns a shop which was recently refurbished. He no longer owns "Darbies" in Derby

HMRC recently investigated Smith, who owes several thousands in outstanding taxes.

Geographic Impact

Sources drugs using connections opened up to the OCG by Nesbitt. Possibly from the Sheffield area

Reside in the Durham area:

Smith h/a – 5 First Terrace
Wood h/a – 6 Second Terrace
Derby h/a – 7 Third St
Nesbitt h/a – 8 Fourth Ave

What we Need to Know

- Who supplies the OCG?
- What other members of the group are there?
- What vehicles is Smith holding as 'investment'?
- What locations does the OCG have available to them?
- Are the group violent? If not, is there another OCG providing protection? OMEGA OCG?
- Who resides in the properties owned by Smith?
- Where are the counterfeit goods sourced and sold?
- Do the group have a hold over the local community?

Locality
East

Plan Owner
DI Jones

OCG's Intent & Capability

Violence
Unknown. There is a lack of intel coming from the community. Could this infer that the group have a reputation for violence and intimidation?

Cash Flow

Smith is cash rich, more so since various investments with a third party were fraudulently misappropriated. Smith appears to buy his properties and vehicles at auction. It is believed that Mr Wood's money is tied up in his business and that he is indebted to members of another OCG.

Cohesion

The group has strong bonds and contains family members and old associates from childhood.




Part 2

This example allows a generic template to be used, which is subsequently tailored to each network reflecting criminality and vulnerability for a county line network.¹⁶

'CL TEAM'

THE 'CL TEAM' ARE A LARGE, WELL ESTABLISHED DRUG DEALING TEAM IN [LOCATION 1] WITH STRONG LINKS TO [LOCATION 2] THEY ARE CONCERNED IN THE SELLING OF HEROIN, CRACK COCAINE AND CANNABIS.

SIGNIFICANT MEMBERS



- INTELLIGENCE FROM [DATE-] SUGGEST THAT THE TEAM HAVE 11 YEAR OLD VULNERABLE YOUTHS WORKING FOR THEM AS RUNNERS



- IN [DATE-], A FIREARM WAS DISCHARGED IN [LOCATION 1] WHICH WAS INTENDED FOR [NOMINAL 1] WHO DEALS FOR THE 'CL TEAM'. [NOMINAL 1] IS BELIEVED TO BE SEEKING RETRIBUTION AS A RESULT. SEVERAL MEMBERS OF THE TEAM HAVE WARNINGS FOR FIREARMS.



- RECENT INTELLIGENCE SUGGESTS THAT MEMBERS OF THE 'CL TEAM' WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR A NUMBER OF ASSAULTS AGAINST RIVAL DEALERS IN THE AREA IN RELATION TO THEIR DRUG DEALING ACTIVITIES. SOME MEMBERS OF THE GROUP ARE BELIEVED TO CARRY KNIVES/WEAPONS AS A MATTER OF ROUTINE.



- [NOMINAL 2], WHO IS A SIGNIFICANT MEMBER OF THE 'CL TEAM', SOURCES CLASS A DRUGS FROM FAMILY ASSOCIATES IN [LOCATION 2]. RECENTLY, ONE OF THE RUNNERS FOR THE 'CL' TEAM, [NOMINAL 3], WAS ARRESTED HAVING BEEN STOPPED IN [LOCATION 1] CARRYING A LARGE QUANTITY OF CANNABIS WHICH WAS CONCEALED IN HIS UNDERWEAR.



County Lines



INTELLIGENCE GAPS

- FULL LIST OF CURRENT MEMBERS
- DETAILS OF CURRENT [LOCATION 2] CONTACTS
- EXTENT TO WHICH THE TEAM ARE OPERATING ACROSS OTHER AREAS OF THE COUNTRY

OFFICIAL



16 Courtesy of Cheshire Police

Section E – Creating a multi-agency response

A multi-agency response



Helpful tip:

A multi-agency response is the most effective way to tackle an OCG and LROs should seek to develop one.

Partners from the public, private and third sectors are well equipped to support the LRO in the design, co-ordination and implementation of the response as they have a vast range of skills, capabilities, assets and knowledge which can help the LRO.

In addition there are likely to be a number of local initiatives being run and managed by partner agencies and community groups to tackle criminality, harm and vulnerability within their communities. Some of these are likely to be either directly or indirectly attributable to the impact of SOC or the OCG that the LRO has been tasked to manage.



Helpful tip:

As LRO, identifying and aligning with those local service providers already delivering interventions attributable to SOC harms or OCG impact within a community will complement what you are trying to achieve. Ensuring this connectivity is a very effective way of building and delivering a 4P response because some of the work will already be undertaken – it just wont be reflected as a P response, now is your chance to capture it!

Similarly, identifying and engaging with the service providers who you can work with and who can provide interventions to support is equally important.

There are a number of ways this alignment can be achieved. You may wish to consider one or all of these.



Part 2

Operational stakeholder group

An operational stakeholder group may naturally be part of one of the SOC-based partnership boards that LROs either attend or report into.



Helpful tip:

Establishing your own local operational stakeholder group, responsible for delivering a local response to disrupt an OCG, will help as these are particularly effective in creating collaborative responses between local partners and frontline practitioners.

Representatives should be from a range of public, private and third sectors who work in the local area or community where the OCG operates or where its harm manifests and should include Community officers, neighbourhood wardens and PCSOs.



Good practice

shows that a combination of the below principles will help in managing an effective local stakeholder group:


- Clear information management protocols are established to ensure information is collected from all partners and shared appropriately
- Physical, remote or virtual presence for the group with regular meetings
- The group should contain frontline practitioners who can help design and deliver 4P tactical interventions bespoke to local opportunities and needs
- Enhancing understanding of the threat, risk, harm and impact posed by the OCG to understand which elements impact on the areas of business or service delivery the stakeholders are responsible for
- Partners should be encouraged to contribute and generate ideas, influenced by their local knowledge of what could work – empowering and enabling them to help, not telling them how to
- Disruption data is collected from all partners
- Collaborative working between partner agencies can be complementary, so the principles of building a whole-system approach within the stakeholder group are explored and enhanced where possible

Government Agency Intelligence Network (GAIN)


The Government Agency Intelligence Network (GAIN) is a ROCU capability that works collaboratively with Government agencies that have an intelligence and investigative remit to develop a single and enhanced understanding of the SOC threat.

The primary focus is on:


Mapped Organised Crime Groups




High risk individuals



Vulnerabilities such as Human Trafficking/ CSE/ CT but not exclusively



A **tasked** operation for the referring agency or organisation



Comprising of 30+ statutory agencies and a host of other non-statutory members from all sectors, including the private sector, GAIN, provides a consistent approach across the intelligence sharing landscape ensuring that the threat and risk posed is accurately assessed using all available intelligence. In addition to the Intelligence Hub Regional GAIN Co-ordinators located within ROCU's support cross agency intelligence collection at a local level and provide support to operational activity through the co-ordination of a multi-agency response.



Helpful tip:

LROs should identify who the regional GAIN representative is as they can provide invaluable support through lawful access to a range of partner-held data, information and intelligence as well as unique operational capabilities to help tackle and disrupt OCGs.



Part 2

Case study

The GAIN co-ordinator facilitated a multi-agency operation to disrupt an OCG using all available criminal, civil and regulatory laws. The OCG nominal was involved in facilitating illegal immigration and modern day slavery via their takeaway and restaurant. The following will show how each agency had an important role to play in the disruption of the OCG:

- Immigration Enforcement issued £100,000 in fines after five illegal workers were found at premises
- HRMC minimum wage team investigation revealed breaches to law, which resulted in owner having to make compensatory payments to staff and further direction to enforce maintenance of correct business records with notice of future visits to ensure compliance
- Fire brigade issued prohibition notices in relation to breaches of fire legislation – these had to be rectified by the owner at cost
- Building control and planning departments identified planning permission had not been sought to build an extended seating area – the owner was forced to take this down at personal expense which also significantly impacted revenue
- Local authority licencing team reviewed alcohol licences for both premises and withdrew them, leading to huge impact on profits due to inability to attract customers
- Health and Safety Executive rated food hygiene standards in one premises at 0, the lowest possible – a press release highlighted the dreadful standard of food safety to the local community impacting on reputation and potential future custom
- Pensions Regulator enforced back payment of monies to support employee pension scheme

SOC community co-ordinators (Home Office sponsored pilot scheme)¹⁷

Community co-ordinators work to deliver a whole-system approach to tackling SOC by strengthening the connectivity between public, private and third sector partners with the aim of reducing the impact of SOC within communities.

LROs working with them can draw on their expertise and knowledge of the partnership landscape to help develop co-ordinated and intensive multi-agency activities to tackle harm caused by OCGs and associated SOC threats.

¹⁷ Nigel Page, Manager of SOC community co-ordinator programme, Home Office: nigel.page3@homeoffice.gov.uk



Good practice

has been delivered by the community co-ordinators in tackling SOC and OCGs in the following ways:

- Partnership development by identifying appropriate and wide-ranging local partners, improving their understanding of SOC
- Connectivity for LROs with Prevent, Protect and Prepare based intervention opportunities being delivered in communities to complement Pursue element of 4P plans
- Leveraging additional funding opportunities from all sectors to support local programmes of activity to reduce vulnerability to SOC
- Identifying, designing and commissioning bespoke local projects to target and divert those most likely to be drawn into SOC, building community resilience and disrupting the demand for illicit goods and services
- Improving collaboration between community-based groups to de-conflict interests and prioritise intervention provision
- Supporting the use of the Clear, Hold, Build (CHB) model to tackle OCGs and the community-based harm they cause

The pilot scheme, running between 2018-2021, is being trialled in eight force areas:

- Bradford, West Yorkshire
- Brighton, Sussex
- Newport, Gwent
- Sedgemoor, Avon and Somerset
- Speke, Merseyside in conjunction with Halton, Cheshire
- Birmingham East, West Midlands
- Haringey and Enfield, London
- Grimsby and Immingham, Humberside

The significant impact and benefit from this role has been independently evaluated by IPSOS Mori.¹⁸

Several forces, including Bedfordshire, Lancashire and South Yorkshire, have also developed roles which, in whole or part, align to those of the community co-ordinators, with others due to follow.

Learning from this pilot will be disseminated across the policing landscape and used to support LROs.



Part 2

Case study

The Merseyside and Cheshire community co-ordinator developed ground-breaking initiatives in bringing the private sector into the SOC landscape at community level. This has shown that extending requests to the private sector, beyond money, to include requests for assets, expertise, capabilities and equipment to tackle SOC threats should be considered.

The initiative connects third sector and voluntary organisations, such as Mutual Gain and Redeem Our Communities, and then encourages further collaboration with local community groups in Speke area of Merseyside. Almost 80 people attended the 'Speke Up' world café and 19 went on to play a role in a community planning group. The group spanned age and experience and shared a common passion in wanting to make Speke a safer place by undertaking positive community action where the community shared resources and supported each other. Bringing this to life, one person stated they needed some computers to help teach elderly people how to protect themselves from online fraud. One of the community action group local business owners subsequently donated them.

A world café event was then strengthened by the 'Speke Up' participatory budgeting event, sponsored through Home Office

community co-ordinator funding as well as Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA) community cashback scheme, donating seizures (£53,000). Local business, community groups and volunteer organisations were asked to bid in to a Dragons Den style event. The criteria for bids was that the money must go towards community-based programmes improving the life of local residents of Speke and diverting youngsters away from SOC. Over 300 members of the public attended the event and voted for the projects they believed would benefit the Speke area most. Examples of successful bids included:

- Garston Adventure Playground – £2,000 to fund a 12-week scheme aimed at raising awareness of CSE, county lines crime and child criminal exploitation (CCE) through delivery of 12 x 1-hour group sessions for parents and children from Speke
- Noah's Ark – £1,500 to provide free meals to struggling families, elderly resident groups, a men's club and adults with learning difficulties – the sessions prevented social isolation, built confidence and resilience and prevented impact of economic harm to local businesses by organised theft from retail outlets that otherwise would have remained closed

Case study

The 'Opt Out' program in Grimsby has been designed by the SOC community co-ordinator.

The program is a collaboration between police, local probation and National Employability Training (part of the Grimsby Institute for Higher Education) to support individuals and divert them away from criminal activities, providing them with the basic skills and confidence to help them gain employment opportunities with enhanced provision to stabilise their lifestyles as well.

Referral mechanisms, supported by a multi-agency response to SOC (MARSOC) and others, identify Individuals and signpost them to attend a three-week course providing 15 relevant qualifications which are worked for and obtained by the participants.

In addition, lifestyle support is given to help stabilise their personal environments and provide a sustainable base for rehabilitation, including support from the Department for Work and Pensions and other statutory agencies, identification and document provision, financial guidance and setting up of a bank account, CV development, interviews skills, a career interview and arrangements for employment interviews. This element has proved to be a critical success factor complementing the scheme, providing an opportunity to support those individuals as opposed to letting them slip back into the cycle of offending by helping to insulate them from harmful behaviour and negative associations.

OCG and SOC nominals have been referred to this scheme and subsequently entered employment.

MARSOC – formerly Lifetime Offender Management (LOM)

The relationship between LROs and MARSOC regional units, via their nominated representatives, will be crucial to ensure individual offenders and the wider OCG they may be part of or linked to are managed in a co-ordinated and effective way.

Co-ordinating this relationship can be undertaken in several ways, such as:

- subjects are considered for MARSOC referral if the criteria dictates
- enrichment of the intelligence picture of an offender and a linked OCG within the MARSOC framework
- supporting an offender's management plans or tactical plans



Part 2

The MARSOC project aims to reduce the impact of the highest-harm persistent serious and organised criminals. Bringing police, prisons, probation and partners together in a co-ordinated way, MARSOC will jointly identify, prioritise and disrupt this cohort if intelligence suggests they are offending while in prison or in the community.



Helpful tip:

As LRO, it is important to ensure your relationship with MARSOC teams is ongoing, and extends beyond conviction. Your input at relevant case conferences will be critical in helping shape their response to the current and future management of the offender.

Community Asset Mapping (CAM)¹⁹

CAM is a methodology which uses deep dives into open source information and voluntary action databases, followed by an engagement process, to create a rich picture and understanding of the local voluntary, community, sports, leisure, faith and business based groups and organisations supporting communities.



Good practice

has shown that this approach is far more comprehensive than placing reliance on 'what is thought to be known' and in adopting this process groups that are often embedded within the heart of communities have been identified who have helped LROs as they:

- have community influencers working within them, who will share their knowledge and links to the local community to help deliver tailored and bespoke interventions aligned to their needs
- provide a large range of interventions locally

Developed by West Yorkshire Police, this has been used by LROs in Bradford, where CAM identified over 1,659 previously unknown groups and organisations across a range of sectors who had the potential to help avert the harm and impact caused by OCG activity. A number of these groups have been contacted directly to help deliver interventions from Prevent, Prepare and Protect pillars in support of the 4P plans.

¹⁹ Developed by Beverly Adams, West Yorkshire Police: Beverley.Adams@westyorkshire.pnn.police.uk

Case study

In Bradford Moor, CAM identified four voluntary groups who were providing vocational activities of sport, music and drama, but each acting in isolation within a high-harm area. LROs had identified this area as being used by OCGs for recruitment purposes and also where vulnerable people were being targeted for illicit movement and exploitation for the purpose of CCE and CSE.

The community co-ordinator brought the four community-based organisations into a single hub, helped de-conflict programme timetables initially running concurrently on two evenings, and re-calibrated the schedules to provide coverage across four evenings and a Saturday. The initiatives were included in the LROs' 4P plans and additional collaborative working was able to show a significant impact against OCGs' ability to recruit from the area which in turn contributed towards a reduction in criminality and harm.

SOC tactical advisers²⁰

Several forces, in conjunction with College of Policing, are developing specialist roles to have designated and accredited SOC tactical advisers, who will specialise and develop expertise to become familiar with a vast spectrum of Pursue interventions from the covert, conventional law enforcement, civil law and regulatory frameworks.

The tactical advisers are further developing their expertise by identifying partner agency and other groups' intervention capabilities within the Prevent, Protect and Prepare landscape.

Forces also have specialist covert policing teams whose tactics and tradecraft may support LRO objectives. Some of these teams will have specialists who will be able to assess the intelligence picture and determine if they are able to help or signpost you to other specialist agencies and teams with assets and capabilities.




Helpful tip:

Engaging with SOC tactical advisers at the earliest opportunity will enable LROs to capture the most effective tactics to deal with the OCG threat.

As a LRO, maintaining regular engagement with force tactical advisers will prove to be an excellent investment of your time as they will be able to directly support you in designing your response to tackle OCGs through the 4Ps.


20 Linda McGrath, project lead at College of Policing: www.college.police.uk



PART 3: Creating a 4P-based operational response

Section F – Tackling OCGs using a 4P response

SOC strategy²¹ and the 4Ps



21 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy 2018: www.gov.uk



Part 3

Creating a whole-system approach is the foundation on which the SOC strategy is built, incorporating the pillars of Pursue, Prevent, Protect and Prepare to help achieve this.

The concept describes the process and outcomes where law enforcement agencies and partners from the public, private, and third sectors work collaboratively to share skills, knowledge, capabilities and assets to tackle an OCG by means of using and pooling interventions from Pursue, Prevent, Protect and Prepare pillars.

The pillars are explained as follows:

PURSUE: *Pursue offenders through prosecution and disruption*

PREVENT: *Prevent people from engaging in SOC*

PROTECT: *Protect individuals, organisations and systems from the effects of SOC*

PREPARE: *Prepare for when SOC occurs and mitigate its impact*

The combination of Pursue, Prevent, Protect and Prepare interventions in tackling OCGs are usually referred to as 4P plans.

Developing your response

As LRO you will be responsible for leading and co-ordinating the design and delivery of the 4P plan.



Good practice in developing 4P plans:

- Each P should be considered at the outset, as you design the response, so that all potential interventions complement each another
- Delegate – responsibility for owning the plan does not mean you have to own each of the P responses within it
- Simplicity – your plans do not need to be over-complicated; sometimes simple responses and quick wins are very effective, especially with relentless disruption
- Utilise frontline community officers – they will be your eyes and ears in the heart of the community and have a wealth of information which will help you
- Identify current community based initiatives to tackle harm, if these are directly or indirectly linked to the OCG – the initiatives can be included in the 4P plan
- Interventions aligned within the P pillar attributed to its primary intention at the point of delivery will help in deciding which P the intervention lies in – outcomes permeating into the other Ps can still be captured within each of those for the performance impact framework

Determining aims and objectives

Clearly stating the aims and objectives will enable the focused delivery of tactical interventions.



Helpful tip:

Establishing a vision at the very onset of what you would like success to be will help to determine the aims and objectives. This allows you to focus on reaching an 'end point' with appropriate closure, otherwise you risk your 4P plan drifting and achieving limited impact.

There are many ways in which aims and objectives can be written and presented on 4P plans. It will be the responsibility of the LRO to decide whether there is a need for single or multiple aims and objectives.

Working definitions to help LROs understand the key differences between aims and objectives:

Aim: What is the overarching outcome you hope to achieve with your 4P plan? This can be quite general.

Objectives: How will each P contribute towards the aim? Be SMART to ensure the objective is focused in playing its part in contributing towards the overarching aim.

If choosing to use an overarching aim for your 4P plan, one or a selection of the below may help:

- Capture and share all available intelligence with partners to create a comprehensive understanding of the OCG and its impact
- Reduce the harm caused by the OCG by targeting its capability, influence and infrastructure
- Reduce the demand for illicit goods and services by disrupting new, emerging and established criminal markets
- Safeguard those who are vulnerable to SOC pathways and exploitation by OCGs
- Reduce the appeal of and demand for SOC careers, lifestyle and behaviours
- Promote collaborative arrangements between partner sectors, agencies and groups to provide viable alternatives
- Raise awareness of SOC threats to individuals, businesses and communities so they are better able to protect themselves
- Develop strong and effective collaborative partnerships with public, private, third and voluntary sectors, agencies and groups to reduce harm and OCG dominance within communities by building community resilience
- Improve community wellbeing
- Challenge and undermine permissive community attitudes of tolerance and acceptability of criminal behaviour



Part 3

The 4Ps in operational context

PURSUE

SOC Pursue focuses on relentless disruption of OCGs

In an operational context this has two trajectories: prosecution and disruption, described as

Prosecution being an outcome of the OCG member’s involvement in criminality or breaches of law, focusing on presenting the totality of offending with sentencing guidelines in mind, often leading to lengthy custodial sentences, which mitigates longer-term harm.

Disruption being an outcome of impeding the OCG’s ability to function or go about their daily business by targeting any aspect of their lifestyle, behaviour, travel, business, vehicle or criminality. These tactics often have shorter-term outcomes in mitigating harm but are incredibly effective at expediently reducing ongoing threat.



Helpful tip:

LROs must consider how they will target the OCG and its members from a Pursue perspective, either by means of investigation and/or disruption.

The decision will be based on a number of factors. You may find some of the below rationale helpful when making this decision:

Rationale for investigation	Rationale for disruption
Likely lengthy custodial sentences for many OCG members	Interventions often short-term, dynamic and immediately impactful
Public interest due to extent of criminality and harm	Cost effective in wake of other priorities
Break, or significant reduction, in serious offending	Easier to establish a multi-agency 4P approach to tackle lower level threats
Longer-term dismantlement of OCG and greater impact against its functionality	Disruption more effectively achieved by use of civil and regulatory powers
Fulfils policing and crime plan or force control strategy priorities	Immediately visible to the public
Provides options for interventions using criminal, civil and regulatory powers	Criminal justice system appetite and thresholds unlikely to be met by investigative resource and cost limitations

Rationale for investigation	Rationale for disruption
Multiple police resources required and are mostly Pursue-centric to gain maximum impact	Impact on sustainable longer-term commitment against other police priorities
Law enforcement agencies leading action against the OCG given the type of offending	Alternative option if covert or conventional police investigative tactics do not reach CPS prosecution thresholds

Relentless disruption

Maximum impact can be achieved by the LRO through the combination of prosecution and disruption activity known as relentless disruption This approach:

- uses the full range of enforcement powers attributed to criminal, civil and regulatory laws, rules and regulations
- targets every aspect of the OCG nominal’s criminal and legitimate activity

Finding their Achilles heel is key, so identifying the laws and regulations they have broken, ignored, breached or failed to comply with followed by robust intervention to force compliance will be impactful.



Helpful tip:

Remember, every law, rule or regulation that applies to you also applies to them, so think creatively.

In achieving this you will begin to disrupt their ability to function and it will cost them time and money, becoming increasingly frustrating and inconvenient.

Creating the Penocotomum effect

In the most effective cases your tactics of relentless disruption will become both physically and psychologically impactful and may help create the Penocotomum effect within the OCG and its nominals – a sense of paranoia due to the increased scrutiny their lives appear to be under by never knowing what element of their behaviours will be targeted next. This is likely to cause them to change their routines and behaviours, consequently disrupting them.

There are a wide range of tools at your disposal to exploit criminal networks and to make the lives of SOC offenders as difficult as possible. These are set out in the College of Policing menu of tactics, which includes hundreds of powers, tools and interventions across national authorities and local agencies to disrupt the activities of OCGs.



Helpful tip:

In deciding your Pursue response, a key question for LROs to consider is: How will you target the OCG and inhibit its ability to function?



Part 3

Examples of Pursue objectives

- Relentlessly disrupt the OCG nominal's ability to function, by making it as difficult as possible for them to go about their day-to-day business
- Utilise specialist and conventional investigation capabilities to secure evidence and bring offenders to justice
- Break the OCG's business model by disrupting the enabling functions of it
- Identify and remove the OCG's finances and criminally acquired assets
- Target the OCG's infrastructure to de-stabilise the inter-personal associations binding its network

Pursue-based disruption activities that have worked:

Vehicles

- **Vehicle defect rectification scheme for construction and use offences** e.g. offences of insufficient water in window wiper screen wash bottle – MOT station has to verify rectification and will often charge for this
- **Private number plate lettering** – failing to comply with spacing and size legislation will require purchase of a new index plate and future breaches may lead to DVLA issuing a revocation notice for use of the index number
- **Driving licence offences of failure to have recent (less than 10 years old) photograph** on driving licence and not displaying current address carries fine up to £1,000
- **Report non-disclosure of convictions or driving offences** to insurance company leading to elevation of premiums and/or revocation of insurance

Business

- **Health and safety legislation** – enforcement of and instructing compliance within the workplace will result in fines for non-compliance or temporary closure of premises until breach is rectified e.g. a landlord had his pub, being used as an OCG meeting place, temporarily suspended from opening until a working padlock was fitted to a cellar trap door and fire extinguishers compliant with legislation had been purchased and correctly installed
- **Identification of duckweed** within a business premises resulted in OCG landowner being financially liable for clear-up costs
- **£10,000 fine to an OCG-owned catering business** as worker on premises found to be working illegally
- **Seizure of cars purchased** on Personal Contract Service by mules on behalf of an OCG who then hired them out to other OCGs and criminals – this was achieved by enforcing terms of the contract hire and related insurance policies
- **Local authority powers** enforced to ensure **OCG nominals having to register as social landlords** for owning and letting premises used as houses of multiple occupancy with five or more people, plus enforcement of strict health and safety regulations for landlord e.g. thickness of fire doors

- **Environmental regulations** relating to **storage and disposal of materials**, chemicals, oil and waste products at garages with audit trails – significant fines issued to a ‘facilitator’ for disposal of oil into drainage systems
- **Misuse of Business Names Act** by an OCG providing a false address for a building services business resulted in conviction and a £1 million confiscation order

Case study

Durham Council planning team developed planning application and disclosure-based intelligence-sharing initiatives with police to protect local communities from further OCG infiltration. This has led to stopping:

- the sale of council land to an OCG where outline planning permission was granted to build 36 executive houses
- the sale of two ex-council buildings to an OCG who was going to develop these into houses of multi occupancy
- the sale of three industrial units to an OCG involved in environmental waste crime
- the buying of an OCG member’s house which was to be used as a children’s home
- the granting of planning permission in relation to a care home / hotel in a deprived area, sponsored by OCG-based fraud

Criminality

- **Cash seizure** legislation within POCA to remove illicit funds e.g. a travelling family tried to legitimise a large volume of cash by stating it was from horse trading (horse passport regulations compel owner/seller of a horse to have a horse passport to accompany the beast during sale – failure to comply is an offence) – using cash seizure powers, police successfully claimed that the subsequent accrual of cash, gained by commission of offences of horse trading without a passport, meant the cash was criminal property and were successful in forfeiting £60,000 on this basis
- **POCA confiscation order enforcement** – OCG nominal produced from prison one week before release date where application for extended sentence for non-payment was granted if order was not paid in full – order to value of £36,000 paid following day
- **Distress warrants** applied for against any individual to remove property to clear unpaid confiscation order debts or any other liability punishable by fine
- **Auctioneers** to help with early realisation of criminal property, to stop devaluation or dissipation of assets

Lifestyle

- **Failure to return voting registration** forms detailing residents over 18 within household allows local authority to impose fines up to £1,000
- **Birthday and Christmas cards** sent to OCG nominals with cease and desist notices inside



Part 3

- **Powers of Criminal Courts Sentencing Act to forfeit any attributable or non-attributable assets** or equipment OCG used in the commission of any offence e.g. forfeiture of computers, printers and other property used by a high-risk nominal involved in CSE and for lighting and heating equipment used in cannabis cultivation

Travel

- **Illegally acquired, but non-fraudulent documentation** invokes nominals being stopped and either arrested or returned at border points e.g. Significant OCG nominal illegally acquired a legitimate passport in an alias identity on which he travelled resulted in interception by US authorities on arrival, arrested and returned to UK, tried and received six months imprisonment
- **Travel restriction orders** imposed for anyone receiving a custodial sentence of four years plus for drug trafficking offences
- **Notification of OCG's previous convictions** to embassy and consulates to disrupt travel plans e.g. used for ESTA travel permits to USA
- **Securing driving ban as part of sentencing provisions** for certain drug offences

Behaviour

- **Breach to local byelaws** e.g. OCG nominal recalled to prison for 28 days for breach of prohibition of cycling regulations within town centre after challenge and violent confrontation with PCSO

- **Breach of any provision of an ancillary order** previously obtained e.g. number of registered phones permitted to be owned by OCG nominal
- **Local council planning compliance** forced an OCG to put back to its original condition land they'd acquired and illegally built hardstanding on – when they refused, the matter was taken to the high court resulting in jailing of OCG members for contempt, fining them and orders made for third party to complete the work, which was billed to the offenders
- **Planning permission photos** get posted online for every application and can subsequently be used to see into areas of OCG members' property which would otherwise have been invisible, in this case demonstrating unexplained wealth which corroborated intelligence about large-scale drug production
- **Community protection notices and public space protection orders** – warnings and civil injunctions served on people, businesses, premises and hot-spot locations e.g. Blackpool Community Safety Partnership successfully used these to tackle CSE, CCE and other criminality, leading to 96% desistation of activity and future compliance

Targeting Enabler's and Facilitators

Targeting the enablers and facilitators of OCG criminality can significantly disrupt the OCG. Often these individuals will be utilising their professional capabilities and skills to serve a number of OCGs.

Case study

a legal executive was servicing three OCGs by:

- facilitating mortgage fraud by preparing and authenticating false documentation and enabling dissipation of funds to Liberia
- backdating property acquisition and Land Registry documents to negate attribution for POCA confiscation hearings against a drug trafficker
- providing false identification papers to facilitate people trafficking and unlawful immigration

She was prosecuted and received 5 years imprisonment (more than the main offenders) with criminal use of her professional skills referenced as an aggravating feature for the purpose of sentencing.

- **utilising participation in organised crime offences**²⁶ – five years imprisonment for those turning a blind eye to criminal behaviour e.g. those enabling the OCG's criminality by repeatedly selling counterfeit or illicit alcohol and tobacco or provision of a professional service to provide a veneer of legitimacy to OCG business
- **revoking National Lottery** operating licences for newsagents linked to OCGs for selling illicit alcohol etc. used by OCGs for CSE and grooming
- **revoking internet cafe** licences for non disclosure or poor record keeping of IP address declaration by users

PREVENT

Prevent aims to stop the SOC problem at source by helping local and national partners identify, engage with and divert at-risk individuals from involvement in SOC.

It combines programmes of education, diversion, rehabilitation and management of offenders synchronised to the stage of their journey eg becoming involved in SOC by a recognised pathway into it, whilst offending or trying to exit a criminal lifestyle by means of rehabilitation.

This is not to be mistaken for the traditional police concept of crime prevention.

Professional enablers and criminal facilitators can be tackled by:

- **professional bodies or trade associations to secure** compliance with industry standards e.g. British Vehicle Renting and Leasing Association,²² Solicitors Regulation Authority,²³ Waste Management Industry Training and Advisory Board,²⁴ Federation Against Copyright Theft²⁵

22 British Vehicle Renting and Leasing Association: www.bvrla.co.uk

23 Solicitors Regulation Authority: www.sra.org.uk

24 Waste Industry Training and Advisory Board: www.wamitab.org.uk

25 Federation Against Copyright Theft: www.fact-uk.org.uk

26 Participation in Organised Crime Act Offence; Serious Crime Act 2015; www.legislation.gov.uk



Part 3

In an operational context SOC Prevent has been described as

Discouraging people from becoming involved in SOC and members of OCGs in the first place.

Diverting those involved in the OCG away from it

Deterring those at heightened risk of becoming involved by virtue of their vulnerability or exposure to being drawn into an OCG by any of the recognised SOC pathways

Prevent interventions are specific to three target groups – primary, secondary and tertiary – all of which use a combination of statutory agency, voluntary group and third sector support.

Primary	Aimed at young people who aren't necessarily involved in SOC but could be at risk. Interventions are intended to discourage young people from becoming involved e.g. mass participation interventions using education and awareness raising at school.
Secondary	Aimed at people with emerging indicators of being drawn into SOC by virtue of their risk factors or exposure to a SOC pathway. Interventions may involve safeguarding, building on education and awareness, and often begin focusing on individual needs. These interventions may offer additional signposting and diversionary activities aimed at producing opportunities to enhance social mobility away from a SOC pathway, offering life-skills support and personal development, re-education, skills-based qualifications and employment opportunities.
Tertiary	Aimed at the hardest-to-reach and most challenging people, predominantly those involved in OCGs. Interventions are intended to use multi-agency capabilities to facilitate desistance from SOC activity by helping stabilise lifestyles and offer meaningful alternatives as pathways out of SOC.



Helpful tip:

In developing your Prevent response, a key question for LROs to consider is: How are you going to prevent people from being drawn into OCGs and discourage, deter or divert those who have been, away from them?

Examples of Prevent objectives

- Deliver awareness programmes to young people to warn of the dangers of SOC and being drawn into OCGs
- Deliver intervention programmes which tackle indicators of vulnerability and exploitation

- Identify programmes to provide education, social mobility and employment opportunities as an alternative to entering SOC pathways
- Apply for and obtain appropriate ancillary orders against OCG nominals to prohibit future engagement in SOC-enabling functions or criminality
- Explore opportunities with the private and other sectors to divert people away from criminality by enhancing opportunities for employability-based skills, work experience opportunities and employment options
- Identify partners and children of OCG nominals and signpost to safeguarding hubs for assessment of their vulnerability to a SOC pathway or being exploited into SOC

Prevent interventions that have worked

Primary:

- **Alfie's story**²⁷ portraying the real-life award-winning story of a 13 year old being groomed and criminally exploited by drug dealers – using an education film, music, stories and presentation designed for peer-to-peer learning, delivered to schools, youth groups and local clubs within OCG spheres of influence

- **Behind Alfie's Story**²⁸ is for the wider community, adults, parents, carers and teachers to help them understand this journey and show the full extent of the grooming process, showing the child as victim as opposed to having adopted behaviours as a lifestyle choice

Round Midnight²⁹ using interactive learning, presenting real-life scenarios using 'choices and consequences' based learning around risk-based behaviour, such as gang membership and carrying knives, delivered to high-risk schools and year groups, clubs, societies and parent groups in vulnerable locations

- **Community Cougars Foundation**³⁰ linking education and sports at school level and by sector by delivering integrated school curriculum programmes in sports classes, followed by group awareness raising of SOC related themes of exploitation, CSE, cyber risks and grooming and extending to after-school clubs and competitions – additional pathways into club academies and playing apprenticeships at professional clubs have changed people's lives (delivered by ex GB rugby league International Saima Hussein)

27 Alfie's story: Notinourcommunity.org and www.youtube.com (also featured on BBC Children in Need)

28 <https://www.humberside-pcc.gov.uk/News/News-Archive/2020/Launch-of-Documentary-on-Child-Criminal-Exploitation.aspx>

29 Round Midnight: www.roundmidnight.org.uk

30 Community Cougars Foundation; saimacommunitycougars@mail.com



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- **Project Fearless³¹** campaign providing coping mechanisms for young people to prevent them being drawn into criminal pathways or being exploited
 - **Grimsby super school programme³²** – professional sports club community outreach programmes, offering extra-curricular sport opportunities and homework clubs within the football club environment
 - **Spurs education initiative³³** programme – school sport development programme where soccer club community coaches work with teachers to help them plan and deliver sports lessons for inside and extra-curricular activities
 - **Phil Pearce CIC³⁴** – poet, writer and performer giving honest portrayals of the violence on the streets, the reality of gang involvement and knife crime, delivering his lived experience via rap songs and music through YouTube, podcasts and interactive lessons
 - **A Practitioner Toolkit: Working with young people to prevent involvement In Serious and Organised Crime³⁵** – guidance on designing, implementing and evaluating prevent-based initiatives coupled with suggested lesson plans for gun and knife crime teaching initiatives and other intervention options
- Secondary:**
- **Inspiring Leadership Trust³⁶** – a charity-based organisation providing personal and professional development training and support to women and girls who are on, or vulnerable to, SOC pathways, within coercive relationships or from low aspiration areas – bespoke mentoring by business leaders can lead to work-based experience and employment
 - **Project Haggrid³⁷** – a vocational skill-based education programme offering trade-based skills in agriculture, building and hospitality as an alternative to elements of mainstream education – the cohort selected are released from the school curriculum to undertake training, which has led to national awards for participants and opportunities to move into apprenticeships and employment
 - **Street to Boardroom³⁸** – a franchised model based on the principles of ‘The Apprentice’, where those on an offending pathway, or with offending experience, undertake a programme which converts street-based criminal entrepreneurial skills into legitimate business-based skillsets – the aim is for successful candidates to secure a job

31 **Crimestoppers-uk.org**

32 Grimsby Town Football Club: www.grimsby-townfc.co.uk

33 Tottenham Hotspur Football Club education initiative: www.tottenhamhotspur.com

34 Phil Pearce on You Tube: phil@mylifeexperience.co.uk; **Phil Pearce@pearce12Phil**; YouTube live session 6 June 2019

35 Home Office SOC Prevent guidance; www.gov.uk

36 Leigh Bowman-Parkes, Inspiring Leadership Trust: www.inspiringleadershiptrust.co.uk

37 The Haggrid Project: www.daac.org.uk

38 Clayton Palmer, Street 2 Boardroom; www.street2boardroom.com

Tertiary:

- **Shaping Futures, Changing Lives**³⁹ – a mentoring and personal support programme, specialising in working with hard-to-engage youths, adults and their families to provide 1-2-1 support and diversion opportunities to break offending cycles and rehabilitate, delivered by those with lived experience being an ex-OCG member
- **Empower**⁴⁰ – a specialist employability service provider, offering a series of bespoke skills-based training with employment options for ex-offenders seeking to change their lifestyles
- **Outloud Bradford Moor project**⁴¹ – working with young men to promote relationship building with their estranged and imprisoned OCG nominal fathers, to explain the impact on their lives with a view to identifying tipping points which will lead to desistance and cessation of criminality on release
- **St Giles Trust**⁴² – a national organisation with local reach, delivering specialist wrap-around and intervention programmes with SOC offenders on a 1-2-1 level to divert them from OCG-based criminality
- **Steel Warriors**⁴³ – knives seized from gang members and knife amnesties are smelted, the steel recycled to make frames for outdoor gym equipment that is then offered back to the community where, in tandem, bespoke interventions offering diversion opportunities with gang members are developed

39 Shaping Futures Changing Lives; Toseef Khan; www.sfcl.org.uk

40 Empower Employability Mentoring Programme; www.empowersocialenterprise.co.uk

41 Lauren.batty@outloudltd.co.uk

42 St.Giles Trust; www.stgilestrust.org.uk

43 Steel warriors; Community co-ordinator for Met Police Stuart Smille; stuart.j.smillie@met.police.uk



Part 3

Case study

Everton in the Community,⁴⁴ a multi award-winning project sponsored by Everton Football Club, have developed a whole-system approach to Prevent.

The Everton in the Community impact model:

- works with young people (8-19 years) to reduce the number of at-risk young people from disengaging in school or engaging in criminal cultures and behaviours
- supports the 19-23 age cohort with life skill and employability opportunities
- provides direct provision of utilities for the most vulnerable families

Reaching into local communities such as Speke and Halton districts, the programme adopts four interlocking themes: education, community, support and pathways.

Education – includes an enterprise programme, vocational pathways and bespoke educational projects that include PHSE activities

Community – community and multi-sport programme

Support – intensive support programmes for those most at risk of becoming exploited and harmed

Pathways – employability programmes to help young people build skills for the future within the construction, sports, media, education and hospitality sectors

The Blue Family Campaign is a scheme where these themes converge and are mutually exclusive. Since inception, over 6,750 families have been supported during lockdown alone.

44 Everton in the Community, the official charity of Everton Football club, www.evertonfc.com

Education:

- 400 laptops secured and distributed to year 10 students who have been identified by schools as vulnerable with no access to online provisions (this programme will link into their pathway model with the view of measuring the impact on the progression routes of these young people post year 11)
- Mainstream online education and targeted mentoring sessions, the success of which has led to the development of an interactive digital platform to deliver a blended programme for their partner schools and young people to access in the future

Community:

- Completed 6,200 check-in calls
- More than 2,000 emergency food parcels distributed
- 450 families supported with utilities
- £20,000 worth of produce donated to Liverpool foodbanks

Support:

- Refugee family who had not received benefits were given food vouchers, mobile phone top ups and games for the children
- Family who had been victims of domestic abuse and fled to grandparents for the lockdown supported with new beds and clothes when they returned (these had been damaged as their house had become infested with rats while they were away)
- Supporting a family that had just had a house fire with replacement kitchen utensils and a food package
- Provision of bus passes for families to help relieve family pressures and reduce domestic violence

Pathways

- Virtual learning/mentoring for high need students, utilising support workers who have built ongoing and trusted positive relationships
- Online support for job and career opportunities for year 11 school leavers



PROTECT

SOC Protect focuses on protecting individuals, organisations, businesses, communities and systems from the harm of SOC caused by means of incursion, infiltration and corruptive influence.

In an operational context, SOC Protect has been described as,

stopping people and businesses from becoming victims of SOC threat, OCG-based criminality, influence or harm in the first place.

Many Protect-based initiatives are sector led. Companies, businesses, regulatory bodies, organisations and voluntary groups, from national to local level, housed within these sectors, have developed proactive methodologies and self-help toolkits to protect those accessing the sector from harm caused by criminal manipulation of it.



Helpful tip:

In developing your Protect response, a key question for LROs to consider is: How are you going to stop people and businesses from becoming victims of OCG criminality?

Examples of Protect objectives

- Identify vulnerable persons within communities who may be at risk of falling victim to organised crime and ensure that safeguarding principles through partnership engagement and neighbourhood policing takes place to protect them
- Identify and provide support from local or national campaigns to those businesses vulnerable to risk from OCG criminality or influence within local communities
- Design and implementation of initiatives to protect local people and businesses from future risk to new and emerging crime threats identified elsewhere

Protect interventions that have worked

- **Illegal Money Lending Team**⁴⁵ – campaigns and training for companies and employees at risk to protect them from falling victim to insider threat generated by OCGs targeting employees in financial difficulties
- **Home Office**⁴⁶ campaigns working with professional governing bodies such as accountants and lawyers to protect them from becoming professional enablers to OCGs
- **Take Five**⁴⁷ – national cyber security campaign offering straightforward protective security advice to businesses and public-sector organisations to protect themselves from fraud, including potential criminal exploitation from malware attacks or data theft from OCGs
- **Action Fraud**⁴⁸ – aimed at informing citizens of personal protective measures which can be taken against new and emerging fraud-based crime trends and methods identified elsewhere, which could harm people within local communities
- **No cold calling zones**⁴⁹ – imposition within geographical areas to prohibit OCGs from specifically identifying and targeting vulnerable people within their homes with falsely presented urgent requirements for building work or doorstep sale of unregulated or substandard products
- **Home Office procurement fraud guidance**⁵⁰ – providing practical advice for local authorities including councils and educational establishments to protect them being subject to procurement fraud by OCGs
- **Real deal campaign and toolkit**⁵¹ – designed by National Markets Group to protect market shoppers and businesses from the threat of counterfeit goods for IP protection, giving a host of tactics for private businesses to protect themselves from IP crime
- **Scammers**⁵² – Financial Conduct Authority booklet detailing a host of the most popular scams
- **Protect yourself from scams**⁵³ – WHICH consumer magazine’s guidance on avoiding becoming a victim of fraud

45 Illegal Money Lending Team: Catherine.wohlers@birmingham.gov.uk

46 Home Office Research, Information and Communication Unit; www.homeoffice.gov.uk

47 Take Five campaign to stop fraud: takefive-stopfraud.org.uk

48 Action Fraud: actionfraud.police.uk

49 Bedfordshire Trading Standards No Cold Caller Campaign: www.centralbedfordshire.gov.uk

50 Home Office guidance on supporting local authorities prevent procurement fraud by OCGs: www.gov.uk

51 National Markets Group: www.realdealmarkets.co.uk

52 Financial Conduct Authority: www.fca.org.uk

Which consumer magazine: which.co.uk/cr-scams



Case study

Brighton community co-ordinator developed a multi-agency engagement programme to build a positive relationship and gain trust within the Albanian community. It aimed to give the community confidence and re-assurance that the local apparatus was present and receptive to their needs and that they could reach out to it to protect them from harm if needed.

Key steps and learning from this initiative included:

- Identification of a community leader. Gaining trust is a key aspect when engaging with more challenging communities and establishing key individuals to work with is paramount to any success. A respected member of the Albanian community was identified and objectives of the project explained. Having gained their support, they were asked to facilitate community meetings for wider engagement. This required persistence by all parties and members of the Albanian community agreed to meet informally for a lunch at a local restaurant.
- Positive use of social media to facilitate engagement with the groups and seeking advice about the best ways to do this. Congratulatory community messaging on the Albanian national day proved effective, supported by regular and consistent non-prescriptive messaging recognising community achievements, success stories and reassurance that the community was welcome in Brighton.
- Collaborative partnership working between the local authority and the Mayor's Office was impactful. Community safety partnership leads were fully engaged in the project, becoming members of the project delivery board. The Mayor's Office reached out to the Albanian community on their national day, inviting the Albanian community to celebrate at the Mayor's Office and to meet other members of the community. This helped re-enforce the messaging with positive action and forged strong relationships.
- Engaging with the youth community. Working with St Giles Trust to facilitate credible youth engagement, a semi-professional Albanian boxer was identified, introduced to the Brighton Boxing Club and asked to deliver boxing lessons and offer mentorship to identified Albanian youths both male and female. These lessons were well attended and gave a structure to youths who otherwise would have been tempted to look at Albanian OCGs for guidance. This combination of using credible community members to provide structure, fitness, teamwork and mentorship proved extremely successful.

PREPARE

SOC Prepare is preparing for when SOC occurs and mitigating its impact.

The SOC strategy has helped to shape this further by introducing the concept of community resilience, this being the response to mitigate the adverse impact of SOC when it has occurred.

In an operational context, Community resilience has two aspects:

- **Changing permissive attitudes and tolerance to SOC**
- **Developing community confidence and empowerment** to respond to, withstand and recover from the impact of SOC



Helpful tip:

Community resilience is built within communities by its members; it is not something that can be done to communities.

Permissive attitudes and tolerance to SOC are often deeply entrenched within community cultures, where they appear to be socially acceptable and part of the way of life.

As LRO you may witness these in the form of community-based behaviours which may present as:

- owning or possessing counterfeit lifestyle goods such as clothing, jewellery and fashion accessories

- recreational drug use, especially class A, including cocaine
- acquisition and consumption of illicit commodities e.g. consumable goods such as tobacco and alcohol
- turning a blind eye and passive acceptance to wrong-doing



Good practice

shows that, when trying to influence change to permissive attitudes and tolerance to SOC, success has been achieved when desistation messaging has synchronised with emotions e.g.

- public health based messaging on the dangers of consumption of illicit commodities
- loss of livelihoods as a result of legitimate local businesses, employing local people, being undermined and driven out of communities by market saturation of cheaper, sub-standard or counterfeit goods
- tolerance and acceptability of perceived victimless or low-harm criminality e.g. fraud and recreational drug use providing seed funding for more exploitative criminality including CSE and human trafficking
- tolerance of carrying weapons for protection leading to violent escalation of harm as more extreme weapons are sought e.g. larger bladed knives to firearms



Part 3

In an operational context, community confidence and empowerment is

when members of the community feel sufficiently confident to challenge the activities of the OCG and take a stand against it.

Community confidence and empowerment to tackle SOC is often in the hearts and minds of the majority of the community but they are often too scared to do anything for a multitude of reasons, including feelings of isolation and detachment from statutory agency support and fear of repercussions from the OCG.

The clandestine influence OCGs have within communities, which further fuels fear should not be underestimated. Their criminality may be overt, but their stranglehold on the community is also born from coercive control and benevolent exploitation, traits of which may not be visible to the LRO, but may be captured in community intelligence, which may report the OCG as being:

- the supplier of local goods and services
- assuming a patriarchal role within the community as a 'fixer'
- untouchable and doing as they wish
- using legitimate guises to secure local public sector and other contracts
- infiltrating local businesses to accumulate criminal capital
- money lenders and debt enforcers
- provider of alternative community governance and protection
- sponsoring new and hidden harms linked to its activity

As LRO you are partly responsible for helping create the conditions where confidence can thrive and communities feel sufficiently empowered to respond.



Helpful tip:

LROs can be highly influential in helping create confidence and empowerment if they can identify those people from the local community who can galvanise and lead the response.



Good practice

shows that these people are often those who have personal resonance and connections to the community e.g.

- those with practical skills, capacity and knowledge
- those who have the passions and interests of local residents at heart, and give them energy to make change
- individuals who can build social capital within those communities e.g. those having influence with private-sector organisations to encourage them to use their assets, skills and capabilities for extended community benefit e.g. offering apprenticeships, facilities for skill-based learning and sponsoring local initiatives
- individuals and groups who can resonate with and reach into new, emerging or seldom-heard groups within those communities

- local institutions and agencies which draw legitimacy from local people because they are established in the local area and have credibility within it



Helpful tip:

In developing your Prepare response, a key question for LROs to consider is: How can you contribute to or support others within the community to build community resilience?

Examples of Prepare objectives

- Raise awareness of ongoing harm being caused within a community by OCGs
- Identify vulnerable locations within communities where harm is manifesting and create a place-based response to tackle them
- Tackle permissive attitudes to SOC within local communities by using a wide range of communication platforms and counter-narrative campaigns led by credible third party social influencers e.g. YouTubers
- Develop support networks with partner agencies to reduce the vulnerability of silent communities and individuals who have been victims of harm or suffering, continued harm, abuse or exploitation
- Develop effective local collaborative arrangements to strengthen and support communities' ability to build community resistance

Prepare interventions that have worked

- **Project Fearless**⁵⁴ – briefings and educational training to partner agencies/staff so they are aware of the criminality of the OCG and can identify opportunities to work together to address/mitigate against the impact
- **Sid the Shark campaign**⁵⁵ – warning communities about falling victim to loan sharks, forming part of a wider approach for public engagement events to highlight awareness and indicators of criminality being experienced within the community

54 Crimestoppers: www.crimestoppers-uk.org

55 Sid the Shark-Stop Loan Sharks campaign, UK Illegal Money Lending Team: www.stoploansharks.co.uk and Catherine Wohlers Catherine.Wohlers@birmingham.gov.uk



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- **Too Much Bling, Give us a Ring**⁵⁶, Dirty Money and Filthy Rich community campaigns, led by Leicestershire police to encourage the public to report their suspicions of OCG nominals using their ill-gotten gains to buy property, cars and other luxury lifestyle items, coupled with a campaign to de-glamorise this perceived status by changing the language associated e.g. using the words filthy and dirty to emphasise the illegality of its origin
- **Illicit tobacco public health campaign**⁵⁷ by Trading Standards targets children, warning of the links between purchasing illicit tobacco and subsequent exploitation into SOC
- **Redeem Our Communities conversations**⁵⁸ are community engagement events to bring about community transformation by creating connectivity between statutory agencies, voluntary groups and churches – these partnerships form new volunteer-led projects by developing a community action group which seeks to address the community’s social needs, including a toolkit of 101 event ideas
- **Sports Traider**⁵⁹ use social enterprise schemes to start up or support local businesses by providing high-quality sports equipment for onward sale in the community – the sports equipment is provided free when donated, or purchased for negligible cost, and re-sold at significant discounts; profits from the shops are re-distributed into local communities and provide employment opportunities and training for offenders transitioning to rehabilitation
- **Sports Traider, RECLAIM!**⁶⁰ – community recycling initiatives where programmes of activity are developed to collect unused sports equipment from company employees and their families and then re-distributed to schools and community groups for extended use by participants
- **Centre 4** established a community-based employment agency within a community hub, with local business proactively encouraged to provide work experience, apprenticeship and job opportunities to local people from local communities to counter drivers of crime⁶¹

56 Leicestershire Police, Too much Bling Give us a Ring campaign: info@leicestermedia.online and YouTube, 25 September 2018

57 Trading Standards illicit tobacco and links to organised crime campaign: www.keep-it-out.co.uk

58 Debra Green OBE, is CEO at Redeem our Communities: info@roc.uk.com or www.roc.uk.com

59 Sports Traider, Founder Lance Haggith BBC Sports Personality of the Year ‘Unsung Heroes’ winner 2010: www.sportstraider.org.uk and You Tube 12 June 2014

60 Lance Haggith, Reclaim Sport, You Tube 28 December 2016, from BBC News Birmingham: <https://youtu.be/OY1rr6z-nJA>

61 Centre4.org.uk

- **Community influencers**⁶² from within local police or agencies used to communicate effectively with communities in which they have reach and influence to deliver essential messaging via sermons or through religious establishments to congregations directly, or by live streaming into homes, which help challenge cultural attitudes to SOC-based harms of CSE, modern slavery and FGM
- **Community credit unions and institutional target hardening workshop**⁶³ – outreach programmes delivered by Illegal Money Lending Team to establish community credit unions and practical staff-based workshops to prevent financial manipulation of individuals and to thwart insider threat risks from criminal networks
- **Brighton and Hove Community Works**⁶⁴ have existed for six years and are in a position to network and support voluntary groups

Case study: Creating a whole-system approach to community resilience

Bradford Moor play and support scheme (PASS)⁶⁵

Local parents saw a hard-standing play area in Attock Park Bradford become decimated by criminality, with criminal networks totally taking over the area to become a drug distribution and user hotspot, depriving the community of much needed safe spaces.

The parents decided to make a stand and push back against this criminality and influence, galvanised support from Bradford Council, Ward officers, Youth services and developed Bradford Moor PASS.

Numerous initiatives have been developed, including:

- re-development of the play area now used for community five-a-side football
- green space community garden, where local businesses provided soil, fencing and shrubs and provided support to help the local parents and children create the garden, which is now maintained at weekends by volunteers, some of whom are gaining accreditation-based skills
- Community cook-outs organised by community elders at weekends to feed the young people helping with the garden and playing football

62 Inspector Khalid Kan, Bradford: Khalid.Khan@westyorkshire.police.uk

63 Tony Quigley, Head of UK Illegal Money Lending Team: Tony.quigley@birmingham.gov.uk

64 www.bhcommunityworks.org.uk

65 Bradford Moor Pass: www.bradfordmoorpass.co.uk



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- small shelter area for evening gettogethers for elderly
- additional outreach work to engage with vulnerable people within the community and signposted them into the Laserdyke Community Centre which brings together vocational service providers under one setting
- fluid approach to deliver new initiatives, based on local needs and requests e.g. boxing classes
- contact with other service providing groups, such as Breaking the Cycles, and collaborative service provision and signposting between these groups

- built relationships with local neighbourhood policing teams to break down barriers of engagement
- acted as referral point for LROs to signpost those vulnerable and exploited by local OCGs to support and diversion-based activity

The area is now a thriving hub within the community, providing safe places and spaces for people who have been displaced from the area, free from criminal and OCG influence.

SARA, Spatial and U-Battle – other existing approaches to tackle OCGs

Irrespective of approach taken to tackle an OCG, the 4P principles should be adopted and moulded into that approach to optimise impact.

Numerous other operating models exist to tackle criminality and mitigate harm including the SARA (scanning, analysis, response and assessment) model, which was born from concepts of problem orientated policing and has often been used by community policing teams to tackle problems within communities, many of which will invariably have

emanated from the direct or indirect harm from OCGs. This model is well documented and so not reiterated within this guidance.

From SARA,⁶⁶ others are also emerging, such as the SPATIAL⁶⁷ model which dissects the model further to explicitly recognise additional components of each, such as prioritisation from the scan element and learning from the assessment section which is beginning to be used to tackle policing challenges such those on the roads and within transport networks.

66 SARA Model- College of Policing Knowledge hub: www.college.police.uk

67 Steve Burton and Mandy McGregor: SPATIAL-Enhancing SARA: a new approach in an increasingly complex world. Crime Si Crime Science 7, article 4 (2018): <https://doi.org/10.1186/s40163-018-0078-4>

S		A	R		A	
Scan		Analyse	Respond		Assess	
S	P	A	T	I	A	L
Scan	Prioritise	Analyse	Task	Intervene	Assess	Learn

U-Battle⁶⁸


The U-Battle toolkit targets the higher-harm OCGs and impedes their operation by using a series of key questions adapted from business analysis techniques. **Utilising business analysis techniques towards targeted law enforcement (U-Battle)** is specifically aimed at creating a product to aid detectives and analysts in developing strategies and tactics to pursue, deter and dismantle OCGs. This business-focused approach allows operational vulnerabilities that may have previously remained hidden to be identified and used against the OCG when a plan to dismantle their activities is being developed.

The plan is in three phases:

1. Defining the OCG's activities and how it operates
2. Splitting the activities into three areas:
 - operational vulnerabilities
 - financial vulnerabilities
 - market vulnerabilities
3. Developing a series of investigative tactics and recommendations based on the analysis from the previous sections of the toolkit that aid the investigator in developing a strategy to stop the OCG operating



Section G – Clear, Hold, Build⁶⁹ – an operational framework to tackle SOC threats



69 Ministry of Defence – GOV.UK

Clear, Hold, Build is an operational framework designed to tackle one or a combination of SOC related threats including:

- **Criminal networks**, including OCGs and Urban Street Gangs (USGs) and connected factors that form networks such as county lines
- **Priority individuals**, including those causing or facilitating highest harm
- **SOC vulnerabilities**, including thematic threats
- **Priority locations**, including geographic areas, providing home to one or a combination of the above which can also include other impact factors and other areas of harm contributing to the threat, harm and risk of the location

The model has the flexibility to be scaled up or down depending on the nature of the threat, allowing it to be used to tackle single or multiple threats ranging from least to most complex.

Using CHB to tackle OCGs embedded in communities

Each threat can be tackled using the CHB methodology but, for the purpose of this guidance, the model is adapted to contextually support LROs tackling OCGs embedded within communities.

Tackling OCGs who have become generationally embedded in communities and whose influence and criminality is entrenched is challenging.

CHB provides a framework, based on a three-phase operating model, which has been designed to simultaneously tackle the threats from OCGs, local vulnerabilities exploited by them and the impact of individual and place-based harm they cause.

Each phase outlines an operational requirement. An inter-operable 4P approach for each phase should be considered, which delivers integrated tactical options in a systematic, proportionate and relevant way.

The aim is to reduce crime and harm caused by OCGs.



Clear targets, relentlessly disrupts and removes the OCG



Hold consolidates and stabilises the clear phase by providing counter measures to stop other OCG members re-establishing themselves and undermining community confidence



Build seeks to change the community culture, improve the environment and develop partner agency and stakeholder capabilities to create sustainable resilience and safety for those communities

Benefits of the CHB operating model for LROs may include:

- **A framework providing connectivity within an operational journey which seeks to deliver impact against SOC-related offenders, vulnerabilities and harm in a single joined-up approach**



Part 3

- **The LRO can determine exactly what their role is and their team's parameters** at each stage of the delivery, coupled with exit strategies and mechanisms for handing over responsibilities to others when their work is complete
- **Complements the 4Ps by allowing inter-operable and blended use of P-based interventions at each of the CHB phases**
- **A whole-system approach to simultaneously tackle multiple SOC threats** by encouraging partners, stakeholders and the community itself to work collaboratively at every level and within every stage
- **Qualitative assessment of impact**, relying on sensory perceptions of change from the community, because the model captures working with them, not doing something to them
- **Effective combination of capabilities and skills** as it combines the best of core investigative doctrines, innovative disruption methods using all powers and levers and the best of partnership problem-solving capabilities

Explanation of the phases

Clear phase	<p>Interventions that target OCG members, their networks, business interests, criminality and spheres of influence.</p> <p>This phase seeks to arrest and remove the OCG members but also relentlessly disrupt everything they do, criminal or otherwise, to inhibit their ability to operate.</p> <p>Collectively these tactics start to reduce the impact of the OCG and the harm caused by releasing the stranglehold they exert on the areas they control, occupy and influence.</p> <p>Initially cleared areas, free from OCG criminality and control, may instantaneously become attractive as other OCGs seek to exploit the vacuum created by moving into those areas.</p>
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<p>Hold phase</p>	<p>Counter measures and contingency plans to ensure those areas initially made safe remain so and community perceptions of improved security, re-assurance and confidence are not undermined.</p> <p>This phase seeks to consolidate and stabilise the clear phase by stopping remaining or other OCG members capitalising on the vacuum created by moving into the location, capturing the illicit market or gaining a foothold of influence in the area.</p> <p>Collectively these tactics start to build trust with the community and enhance the relationships between them, the police and statutory agencies, providing good foundations for the Build phase.</p> <p>In the Hold phase, psychological and physical distance is re-affirmed and widened between the OCG and the community it harms, which further undermines its influence.</p>
<p>Build phase</p>	<p>A whole-system approach to deliver multi-agency and community-empowered interventions to create sustainable resilience and safety within communities to mitigate SOC related harm.</p> <p>This phase seeks to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • challenge and change community cultures including community perceptions, permissive attitudes and behaviour so the community creates its own voice on tolerance • improve the living, working and recreational environments by empowering the community to work with stakeholders to be involved in its own development and create its own resilience • develop partner agency and stakeholder capabilities to create a whole-system approach to improve service provision based on need <p>Collectively these tactics start to make change for the better. They revitalise the community landscape, its infrastructures, environment and general wellbeing, which creates sustainable frameworks to tackle systemic drivers of crime, exploitation of vulnerabilities and place-based harm.</p> <p>During Build a new normal can begin to be created. Options to resume Clear should be considered to deter OCGs re-establishing themselves and harm manifesting.</p>



Part 3

What works for LROs when constructing a CHB plan

- **Police response is focused and specific:** police's direct level of responsibility and intervention is aligned to a graduating scale from Clear through Hold to Build, as other agencies, partners and groups have to take responsibility to influence elements of the community landscape they are responsible for
- **Designing Hold and Build phases from onset:** it is critical that partners from all local sectors, agencies and groups are involved in developing the Hold and Build phases at the onset of operational planning, alongside Clear options, to provide smooth and consistent transitions between phases
- **Recognising where convergence between the stages exist and needing to revisit:** the model is not necessarily linear or finite at each stage; it may be cyclical and there is likely to be overlap between phases, especially if new OCGs or vulnerabilities emerge
- **Targeting outliers to arrive at epicentre:** use of CHB to target outliers on either small or large scale such as peripheral subjects, areas of influence, sections of the illicit market and non-primary locations – is an effective method to create a 'bridge' which will lead you to the main subjects, their markets and geographic places of influence.

Being outcome focused, as communities will only remain engaged if they see and feel the environment changing – they will look for improvements in:

- community wellbeing and safety
- educational and skills-based learning
- employability options
- social mobility by increasing access to vocational services e.g. sports, leisure and cultural facilities
- any form of visible regenerative programme or local project e.g. street cleanses, building repair, knife/needle banks
- improved service provision relevant to community needs

Clear phase

Ensure visible, high profile and overt targeting of as many of the OCG nominals and their associates as possible through a combination of relentless disruption and investigative methods. This shows the community that no one is untouchable.

Case study

Merseyside police removed £25,000 gates used to fortify a residential premise giving the impression of invincibility to the community – angle grinding them off in broad daylight delivered a loud and clear message that they weren't untouchable!

Hold phase

Establish a stakeholder group to deliver interventions. This shows the community is not alone or isolated and builds trust in statutory partners.

Case study

Confident that statutory agencies were visible and supportive, a staff member from a community centre in Grimsby directly and openly challenged an OCG principal nominal, who had previously acted with impunity, about their intentions to steal animals from a community centre as a means of retribution – after the challenge the animals were not stolen.

- work with the community itself to create something new and different to tackle an emerging or ongoing threat which acts as a credible alternative
- developing partner agency and stakeholder capabilities
- contribute to CAM initiatives where your expertise can be used to better connect ongoing workstreams and interventions to ensure collaborative opportunities are maximised
- ensure your work, influence or initiatives dovetail with helping drive wider community infrastructure change e.g. redevelopment or regeneration plans and improved service provision

Build phase

Focus on what you can take responsibility for in the Build stage. Examples could include:

- Challenging and changing community cultures
 - interventions supported by community influencers to run counter-narrative messaging campaigns to challenge permissive attitudes and behaviours, undermine benign community inhibitors and reduce fear
- Improving the environment by empowering the community
 - interventions with stakeholder group members to refresh, support or help rejuvenate ongoing local initiatives and diversion schemes to stop pathways into SOC

Case study

Community-based vulnerability as a result of job losses was exploited by an OCG who facilitated illegal money lending, leading to debt bondage and subsequent coercion of law-abiding people to engage in growing cannabis, inducing mental health concerns manifesting in increased reliance on prescription medicines. The LRO instigated arrests of the offenders, debt counselling surgeries and access to specialist benefit staff. While the LRO recognised they couldn't influence employment opportunities they worked with the community and Illegal Money Lending Team to identify what could be achieved as part of the Build. They were able to establish a community credit union as a viable alternative to help people manage their finances and offset debt.



Part 3

Having an exit strategy

- by following some of these examples you will be able to create an exit strategy for yourself which allows others to take control, remembering other agencies, partners and groups also have collective responsibility – it is not the LRO's role to Hoover up what others don't or can't do

CHB operational model

An illustrative example of this model has been built using case studies from Gwent to show the connectivity between the Clear and Hold phases in an operational context, with additional Hold-based initiatives trialled in other forces and a final case study from Lancashire to show a Build phase and its impact.

Case Study: Gwent – Operation Empire

The aim was to disrupt an OCG involved in community-based drug dealing and other criminality in Gwent.

LRO established an operational stakeholder group, with all information shared including pre-briefing of target nominals and addresses prior to Clear phase. Multi-agency Clear and Hold plans were made simultaneously to ensure effective transition between Clear and Hold.

Clear involved tackling the OCG and its members by investigation and relentless disruption, predominantly from the Pursue armoury, which led to a pre-planned strike day which included multiple arrests of OCG members, execution of warrants at residential addresses, searches of linked business premises with additional enforcement of civil and regulatory matters by Trading Standards and cease and desist notices served by the housing department on premise occupants.

Hold used a combination of P-based interventions and contingency plans, delivered by partner agencies in a phased approach to support transition between Clear and Hold phases and stabilise the vacuum created.

Safeguarding

Initiatives to stabilise the familial network and mitigate ongoing vulnerability with support from statutory and voluntary agencies:

- Police safeguarding officers attended addresses and made immediate plans with social services to deal with children at premises and make provision for ongoing support
- Education safeguarding officer engaged with schools attended by children of nominals to inform them of the operation so they can provide immediate and ongoing support to children at school in the wake of anticipated behavioural changes and potential trauma

Case Study: Gwent – Operation Empire (continued)

- Police, education and social services officers etc, by means of family case conference or equivalent, identify what support can be made available for families, tailored to bespoke needs
- Details of pre-school children to be checked and contact made with early years provision if required

Linked businesses

Other businesses linked to OCG, natural conduits to continue supporting the criminality directly or indirectly, were targeted by Trading Standards to provide both supportive advice and warnings about the implications of being linked with OCG criminality.

- Visited business premises to check compliance with licencing conditions, stating their presence was due to the links with OCG and offering support if they were subject to future threats
- Attended all mobile phone shops in town and issued awareness notices re heightened likelihood of young people making cash purchases for replacement phones only and requesting heightened due diligence and customer checks to stop early re-establishment of the phone line

Community/street cleanse

Public places showed the hallmarks of drug misuse/supply with discarded needles, drug paraphernalia, discarded litter and rubbish and miscellaneous damage to property. The Hold phase aimed to remove the physical and visible signs of the area appearing to be run down which gave the impression that nobody cared.

- Local council street cleansing teams tasked with street clean-ups in hot spot locations

Community engagement

A community engagement strategy for Hold phase was prepared by a local inspector, designed to reach out to the local community to provide public confidence and reassurance to mitigate threats or intimidation from any remnants of existing OCG or others moving in:

- High visibility police patrol strategy put in place, with dedicated police resources to patrol the local communities for a week after the operation
- Erection of a mobile police station in the area offering local contact point



Case Study: Gwent – Operation Empire (continued)

Gwent Drug and Alcohol Service (GDAS)

Hold phase was designed to provide immediate support to dependent users, to stop them looking to score drugs from alternate sources, reducing demand levels and disrupting the need for an illicit market sponsoring other nominals to move in and fill the void:

- GDAS identified and provided additional support to the users in the immediate aftermath of arrests and operated a triage to refer dependent users with multiple needs to other partners

Gwent Community Psychology Team⁷⁰

Behavioural psychologists available to support police and community project leaders with bespoke advice to reduce drivers of vulnerability directly impacting on children and families:

- Team made available for consultation following the operation if families affected suffer acute distress or require support
- Specialist advice offered to counter local drivers of crime including specialist community modelling and needs advice relevant to drivers of crime and cultural attitudes to it

HMPPS

Anticipating charge and remand decisions, Hold contingency plans were made to maintain disruption of the influence of the network by reviewing locations of offenders and building in strategic distancing provisions:

- Details of OCG members and suspects shared with prison and probation services to ensure members were segregated in prison and that those given bail had prohibitions on member contact enforced

Local housing department

Hold phase designed to prohibit continued use of premise by familial members and other associates to maintain networks and illicit market:

- Cease and desist notices served, tenancy regulations enforced re criminal use of property and eviction notices to be served if required

70 Gwent Community Psychology team, Jen.Daffin3@wales.nhs.uk

Case Study: Gwent – Operation Empire (continued)

Communications

Strategic and local communication channels established to highlight police activity within the community, develop community awareness and knowledge and alleviate initial community concerns arising from increased police presence:

- Co-ordinated communications strategy with consistent messaging established between all agencies
- Police BCU commander personally briefed council leaders and chief executives
- Local police officers briefed local respondents and community leaders who were able to reach into the community, convey consistent messaging and understand emerging community concerns
- Media briefings and high-profile reporting to showcase operational success

Other Hold Initiatives

which have specifically been used to support the Hold phase in disrupting networks, suppressing illicit markets and reducing immediate harm, used by Bedfordshire, Humberside and South Yorkshire Police, have included:

- **Community clear-up of a local park** to avert class A misuse and re-establish play area for families and children, with overt PCSO presence, resulted in females reporting previously unknown hidden criminality of increased sexual predatory behaviour from males within a new and emerging community targeting them by means of grooming in that location, allowing further Pursue-based investigation against offenders
- **Community outreach and volunteer schemes established a non-statutory agency ‘safe zone’** providing shower, toilet, food, clothing and medical needs assessment for homeless and dependent drug users with additional triage service for signposting those in need to designated contact points within statutory agencies
- **Social media geo-profiling in hot spot areas**, offering immediate Crimestoppers and Childline contact and support for those currently being exploited



Part 3

Build phase

Case study: The Grange community centre and hub, Lancashire

- Grange Park is a large social housing estate on the periphery of Blackpool with 6,000 residents and ranked 160th on the Index of Multiple Deprivation – it has numerous social, economic and health based indicators of community-based vulnerabilities and drivers of crime
- The Grange is a unique community partnership comprising voluntary, faith and private sector organisations, providing community facilities housed at the centre including the Blackpool Community Farm, the community shop, a community café, library, pharmacy and a shop
- Specialist groups and service providers offering access to service provision and help are housed within the centre allowing immediately accessible support i.e. people recovering from addiction (through Jobs Friends Houses), people with complex mental health needs (through adult social care mental health teams) and people with learning disabilities (through the local day care centre)
- Agencies and groups are brought together to offer a variety of weekly activities, courses and workshops including activities to improve health and wellbeing – such as Zumba, health walks, knit and natter, gardening, a community choir, cook and eat sessions – and social activities – such as bingo, quiz nights, and youth provision for after school, evenings and holidays
- Some headline figures for the past two years show:
 - 340 volunteers involved (10 progressed to work)
 - 13,509 volunteer hours
 - 92 different activities provided
 - 10,480 participants
 - 15 large community events
 - 500% increase to 623 local adult learners taking educational and skills-based courses since 2017
 - Creative and entrepreneurial opportunities have allowed a number of residents to set up micro-businesses within the centre

- In less than two years the centre has become the hub of community life and a driver of community empowerment – formal evaluation, professional judgement and resident perception has shown The Grange has had a profoundly positive impact on community inclusion creating improved sense of community, increased community ownership of the Grange Park estate, reduced vandalism, crime and exploitation with reduced adverse criminal influence from OCGs, notwithstanding the other social fabric indicators of enhanced health, wellbeing and opportunity where the community has indicated that people now see better futures for themselves



Measuring success of a CHB response

The CHB model, in addition to assessing quantitative and qualitative outcomes from the national performance framework, lends opportunity for the LRO to assess impact in terms of sensory perceptions of the community.

Areas to consider which may support this are:

- increased confidence in policing and statutory agencies
- investment of skills, assets, capabilities and funding from third, voluntary, sport and leisure sectors and local businesses
- feelings of enhanced community wellbeing

Further information and operational support on CHB is available from Shane Roberts, SOC Policing Unit, Home Office:

Shane.roberts3@homeoffice.gov.uk

Conclusion

SOC will continue to evolve, as will law enforcement infrastructures, the SOC System, priorities and processes. LROs will need to adapt to these and accommodate them within their work and responsibilities when fulfilling this role, both now and in the future.

Irrespective of infrastructure and SOC system changes, the harm and destruction caused by OCGs will remain, it is hoped that by making use of this guidance you will be able to reduce crime and harm and make significant difference to the wellbeing of individuals, businesses and local communities.

The collective impact of your individual contributions can and will dramatically change the national landscape so there is no safe space for OCGs to operate.

Glossary

Acronyms and abbreviations

4Ps	Pursue, Prevent, Protect, Prepare
BCU	Basic Command Unit
CAM	Community Asset Mapping
CHB	Clear, Hold, Build
CCE	Child Criminal Exploitation
COI	Community of Interest
CSE	Child Sexual Abuse
CSE	Child Sexual Exploitation
FTT	Federated Tasking Team
GAIN	Government Agency Intelligence Network
ISA	Information Sharing Agreement
LRO	Lead Responsible Officer
MARSOC	Multi-Agency Response to SOC
MoRiLE	Management of Risk in Law Enforcement
OCG	Organised Crime Group
P-mech	Prioritisation Mechanism
PND	Police National Database
ROCTA	Regional Organised Crime Threat Assessment
ROCU	Regional Organised Crime Unit
SOC	Serious and Organised Crime
SIO	Senior Investigating Officer
SPOC	Single Point of Contact
SRO	Senior Reporting Officer

